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Capacity Results for Relay Channels with
Confidential Messages
Yasutada Oohama and Shun Watanabe
Abstract— We consider a communication system where a relay
helps transmission of messages from a sender to a receiver. The
relay is considered not only as a helper but as a wire-tapper who
can obtain some knowledge about transmitted messages. In this
paper we study a relay channel with confidential messages(RCC),
where a sender attempts to transmit common information to both
a receiver and a relay and also has private information intended
for the receiver and confidential to the relay. The level of secrecy
of private information confidential to the relay is measured by
the equivocation rate, i.e., the entropy rate of private information
conditioned on channel outputs at the relay. The performance
measure of interest for the RCC is the rate triple that includes
the common rate, the private rate, and the equivocation rate as
components. The rate-equivocation region is defined by the set
that consists of all these achievable rate triples. In this paper
we give two definitions of the rate-equivocation region. We first
define the rate-equivocation region in the case of deterministic
encoder and call it the deterministic rate-equivocation region.
Next, we define the rate-equivocation region in the case of
stochastic encoder and call it the stochastic rate-equivocation
region. We derive explicit inner and outer bounds for the above
two rate-equivocation regions. On the deterministic/stochastic
rate-equivocation region we present two classes of relay channels
where inner and outer bounds match. We also evaluate the
deterministic and stochastic rate-equivocation regions of the
Gaussian RCC.
Index Terms— Relay channel, confidential messages, informa-
tion security
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of communications can be studied from informa-
tion theoretical viewpoint by regarding them as a communi-
cation system in which some messages transmitted through
channel should be confidential to anyone except for authorized
receivers.
Information theoretical approach to security problem in
communications was first attempted by Shannon [1]. He
discussed a theoretical model of cryptosystems using the
framework of classical one way noiseless channels and derived
some conditions for secure communication. Yamamoto [2],[3]
investigated some extensions of Shannon’s cipher system.
Various types of multi-terminal communication systems
have been investigated so far in the field of multi-user in-
formation theory. In those systems we can consider the case
where a confidentiality of transmitted messages is required
from standpoint of security. In this case it is of importance to
analyze security of communications from viewpoint of multi-
user information theory.
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The security of communication for the broadcast channel
was studied by Wyner [4] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [5]. Ya-
mamoto [6]-[10] studied several secure communication sys-
tems under the framework of multi-terminal source or channel
coding systems. Maurer [11], Ahlswede and Csisza´r [12],
Csisza´r and Narayan [13]-[15], studied public key agree-
ments under the framework of multi-user information theory.
Oohama [16] discussed the security of communication for the
relay channel. He posed and investigated the relay channel
with confidential messages, where the relay acts as both a
helper and a wire-tapper. Subsequently, the above security
problem in relay communication was studied in detail by
Oohama [17] and He and Yener [18], [19]. Liang and Poor
[20] discussed the security of communication for the multiple
access channel. They formulated and studied the multiple
access channel with confidential messages. Liu et al. [21]
considered interference and broadcast channels with confiden-
tial messages. Tekin and Yener [22] studied general Gaussian
multiple access and two way wire tap channels. Lai and El
Gamal [23] investigated the security of relay channels in a
problem set up different form [16].
In this paper we discuss the security of communication for
the relay channel under the framework that Oohama introduced
in [16]. In the relay channel a relay is considered not only as
a sender who helps transmission of messages but as a wire-
tapper who wish to know something about the transmitted
messages. Coding theorem for the relay channel was first
established by Cover and El Gamal [24]. By carefully checking
their coding scheme used for the proof of the direct coding
theorem, we can see that in their scheme the relay helps
transmission of messages by learning all of them. Hence, this
coding scheme is not adequate when some messages should
be confidential to the relay.
Oohama [16] studied the security of communication for
the relay channel under the situation that some of transmitted
messages should be confidential to the relay. For analysis of
this situation Oohama posed the communication system called
the relay channel with confidential messages or briefly said the
RCC. In the RCC, a sender wishes to transmit two types of
messages. One is a message called a common message which
is sent to a legitimate receiver and a relay. The other is a
message called a private message which is sent only to the
legitimate receiver and should be confidential to the relay as
much as possible. The level of secrecy of private information
confidential to the relay can be measured by the equivocation
rate, i.e., the entropy rate of private messages conditioned
on channel outputs at the relay. The performance measure
of interest is the rate triple that includes the transmission
rates of common and private messages and the equivocation
2rate as components. We refer to the set that consists of all
achievable rate triples as the rate-equivocation region. Oohama
[16] derived an inner bound of the rate-equivocation region.
In this paper we study the coding problem of the RCC.
In general two cases of encoding can be considered in the
problem of channel coding. One is a case where deterministic
encoders are used for transmission of messages and the other is
a case where stochastic encoders are used. It is well known that
for problems involving secrecy, randomization of encoding
enhances the security of communication. From this reason,
stochastic encoding was always assumed in the previous works
treating security problems in communication. However, in
those works it is not clear how much advantage stochastic
encoding can offer in secure communication. To know a
merit of stochastic encoding precisely we must also know a
fundamental theoretical limit of secure communication when
encoding is restricted to be deterministic. In this paper we
discuss security problems in the RCC in two cases. One is
a case of deterministic encoder, where the sender must use
a deterministic encoder. The other is a case of stochastic
encoder, where the sender is allowed to use a stochastic
encoder. The former case models an insecure communication
scheme and the latter case models a secure communication
scheme. We define two rate-equivocation regions. One is a
rate-equivocation region in the case of deterministic encoder
and call it the deterministic rate-equivocation region. The other
is a rate-equivocation region in the case of stochastic encoder
and call it the stochastic rate-equivocation region.
In this paper, we derive several results on the deterministic
and stochastic rate-equivocation regions. 1 Cover and El Gamal
[24] determined the capacity for two classes of relay channels.
One is a degraded relay channel and the other is a reversely
degraded channel. In the degraded relay channel, channel
outputs obtained by the relay are less noisy than those obtained
by the receiver. Conversely, in the reversely degraded relay
channel, channel outputs obtained by the relay are more noisy
than those obtained by the receiver. Our capacity results have a
close connection with the above two classes of relay channels.
On the deterministic rate-equivocation region, we derive two
pairs of inner and outer bounds. On the first pair of inner
and outer bounds we show that they match for the class of
reversely degraded relay channels. Furthermore, we show that
if the relay channel is degraded, no security is guaranteed for
transmission of private messages. On the second pair of inner
and outer bounds we show that they match for the class of
relay channels having some deterministic component in their
stochastic matrix. We further derive an explicit outer bound
effective for a class of relay channels where channel outputs
obtained by the relay depend only on channel inputs from the
sender.
On the stochastic rate-equivocation region, we derive two
pairs of inner and outer bounds. On the first pair, inner
and outer bound match for the class of reversely degraded
channels. On the second one, inner and outer bounds match for
1The same determination problems of the two rate-equivocation regions
were investigated by Oohama [17]. However, his results on the deterministic
rate-equivocation region contain some mistakes. The results on the determin-
istic rate-equivocation we derive in this paper correct those mistakes.
the class of semi deterministic relay channels. We show that
when the relay channel is degraded, no security is guaranteed
for transmission of private messages even if we use stochastic
encoders.
We compare the deterministic rate-equivocation region with
the stochastic rate-equivocation region to show that the former
is strictly smaller than the latter. It is obvious that the maxi-
mum secrecy rate attained by the deterministic encoding does
not exceed that of stochastic encoding. We demonstrate that
for the reversely degraded relay channel the former is equal
to the latter.
When the relay is kept completely ignorant of private mes-
sage in the RCC, we say that the prefect secrecy is established.
We show that the prefect secrecy can hardly be attained by
the deterministic encoder. In the case of stochastic encoder
the secrecy capacity is defined by the maximum transmission
rate of private message under the condition of prefect secrecy.
From the results on the stochastic rate-equivocation regions,
we can obtain inner and outer bounds of the stochastic secrecy
capacities. In particular, when the relay channel is reversely
degraded or semi deterministic, we determine the stochastic
secrecy capacity.
We also study the Gaussian RCC, where transmissions
are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. We evaluate the
deterministic and stochastic rate-equivocation regions of the
Gaussian RCC. For each rate-equivocation we derive a pair
of explicit inner and outer bounds to show that those bounds
match for the class of reversely degraded relay channels.
On our results on the inner bounds of the rate-equivocation
region we give their rigorous proofs. The method Csisza´r
and Ko¨rner [5] used for computation of the equivocation
is a combinatorial method based on the type of sequences
[25]. Their method has a problem that it is not directly
applicable to the Gaussian case. To overcome this problem we
introduce a new unified way of estimating error probabilities
and equivocation rate for both discrete and Gaussian cases.
Our method is based on the information spectrum method
introduced and developed by Han [26]. Our derivation of the
inner bounds is simple and straightforward without using any
particular property on the sets of jointly typical sequences.
In the RCC, the relay also act as a receiver with respect
to the common message. This implies that when there is no
security requirement in the RCC, its communication scheme
is equal to that of a special case of cooperative relay broad-
cast channels(RBCs) posed and investigated by Liang and
Veeravalli [27] and Liang and Kramer [28]. Cooperation
and security are two important features in communication
networks. Coding problems for the RCC provide an interesting
interplay between cooperation and security.
II. RELAY CHANNELS WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
Let X ,S,Y, Z be finite sets. The relay channel dealt with
in this paper is defined by a discrete memoryless channel
specified with the following stochastic matrix:
Γ
△
= {Γ(y, z | x, s)}(x,s,y,z)∈X×S×Y×Z . (1)
Let X be a random variable taking values in X and Xn =
X1X2 · · ·Xn be a random vector taking values in Xn. We
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Fig. 1. Channel inputs and outputs at the ith transmission.
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Fig. 2. Transmission of messages via relay channel using (fn, {gi}ni=1,
ψn, ϕn).
write an element of Xn as x = x1x2 · · ·xn. Similar notations
are adopted for S, Y, and Z .
In the RCC, we consider the following scenario of com-
munication. Let Kn and Mn be uniformly distributed random
variables taking values in message sets Kn and Mn, respec-
tively. The random variable Mn is a common message sent
to a relay and a legitimate receiver. The random variable Kn
is a private message sent only to the receiver and contains
an information confidential to the relay. A sender transforms
Kn and Mn into a transmitted sequence Xn using an encoder
function fn and sends it to the relay and the legitimate receiver.
For the encoder function fn, we consider two cases; one is the
case where fn is deterministic and the other is the case where
fn is stochastic. In the former case fn is a one to one mapping
from Kn×Mn to Xn. In the latter case fn : Kn×Mn → Xn
is a stochastic matrix defined by
fn(k,m) = {fn(x|k,m)}x∈Xn , (k,m) ∈ Kn ×Mn .
Here, fn(x|k,m) is a probability that the encoder fn generates
a channel input x from the message pair (k,m). Channel
inputs and outputs at the ith transmission is shown in Fig. 1. At
the ith transmission, the relay observes the random sequence
Zi−1
△
= (Z1, Z2, · · · , Zi−1) transmitted by the sender through
noisy channel, encodes them into the random variable Si and
sends it to the receiver.
The relay also wishes to decode the common message from
observed channel outputs. The encoder function at the relay
is defined by the sequence of functions {gi}ni=1. Each gi is
defined by gi : Zi−1 → S. Note that the channel input Si
that the relay sends at the ith transmission depends solely on
the output random sequence Zi−1 that the relay previously
obtained as channel outputs. The decoding functions at the
legitimate receiver and the relay are denoted by ψn and ϕn,
respectively. Those functions are formally defined by ψn :
Yn → Kn×Mn , ϕn : Zn →Mn . Transmission of messages
via relay channel using (fn, {gi}ni=1, ψn, ϕn) is shown in Fig.
2. When fn is a deterministic encoder, the joint probability
mass function on Kn ×Mn ×Yn ×Zn is given by
Pr{(Kn,Mn, Y n, Zn) = (k,m,y, z)}
=
1
|Kn||Mn|
n∏
i=1
Γ
(
yi, zi
∣∣xi(k,m), gi(zi−1)) ,
where xi(k,m) is the ith component of x = fn(k,m) and
|Kn| is a cardinality of the set Kn. When fn is a stochastic
encoder, the joint probability mass function on Kn×Mn ×Xn
×Yn ×Zn is given by
Pr{(Kn,Mn, Xn, Y n, Zn) = (k,m,x,y, z)}
=
fn(x|k,m)
|Kn||Mn|
n∏
i=1
Γ
(
yi, zi
∣∣xi(k,m), gi(zi−1)) .
Error probabilities of decoding at the receiver and the relay
are defined by
λ
(n)
1
△
= Pr{ψn(Y n) 6= (Kn,Mn)} and
λ
(n)
2
△
= Pr{ϕn(Zn) 6= Mn},
respectively.
In the RCC, the relay act as a wire-tapper with respect to the
private message Kn. The level of ignorance of the relay with
respect to Kn is measured by the equivocation rate, i.e., the
entropy rate 1nH(Kn|Zn) conditioned on the channel output
Zn at the relay. Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function
is to the base 2. The equivocation rate should be greater than
or equal to a prescribed positive level.
A triple (R0, R1, Re) is achievable if there exists a sequence
of quadruples {(fn, {gi}ni=1, ψn, ϕn)}∞n=1 such that
lim
n→∞
λ
(n)
1 = limn→∞
λ
(n)
2 = 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Mn| = R0, lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn| = R1,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Kn|Zn) ≥ Re .
When fn and {gi}n=1 are restricted to be deterministic, the set
that consists of all achievable rate triple is denoted by Rd(Γ),
which is called the deterministic rate-equivocation region of
the RCC. When fn is allowed to be stochastic and {gi}n=1
is restricted to be deterministic, the set that consists of all
achievable rate triple is denoted by Rs(Γ), which is called
the stochastic rate-equivocation region. Main results on Rd(Γ)
and Rs(Γ) will be described in the next section.
In the above problem set up the relay encoder {gi}ni=1 is
a deterministic encoder. We can also consider the case where
we may use a stochastic encoder as {gi}ni=1. In this case
the relay function gi(zi−1) ∈ S, zi−1 ∈ Zi−1 is a stochastic
matrix given by
gi(z
i−1) =
{
gi(s|zi−1)
}
s∈S .
Here gi(s|zi−1) is a conditional probability of Si = s
conditioned on Zi−1 = zi−1. When fn is deterministic and
{gi}ni=1 is stochastic, the joint probability mass function on
Kn ×Mn ×Sn ×Yn × Zn is given by
Pr{(Kn,Mn, Sn, Xn, Y n, Zn) = (k,m, s,y, z)}
=
1
|Kn||Mn|
n∏
i=1
Γ(yi, zi |xi(k,m), si ) gi(si|zi−1).
4When fn and {gi}ni=1 are stochastic, the joint probability mass
function on Kn ×Mn ×Sn ×Xn ×Yn ×Zn is given by
Pr{(Kn,Mn, Sn, Xn, Y n, Zn) = (k,m, s,x,y, z)}
=
fn(x|k,m)
|Kn||Mn|
n∏
i=1
Γ(yi, zi |xi(k,m), si ) gi(si|zi−1).
Capacity results in the case of stochastic relay encoder will
be stated in Section III-C.
In the remaining part of this section, we state relations
between the RCC and previous works. When |S| = 1, Γ
becomes a broadcast channel, and the coding scheme of
the RCC coincides with that of the broadcast channel with
confidential messages(the BCC) investigated by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner [5]. They determined the stochastic rate-equivocation
region for the BCC.
Liang and Veeravalli [27] and Liang and Krammer [28]
posed and investigated a new theoretical model of cooperative
communication network called the partially/fully cooperative
relay broadcast channel(RBC). The RCC can be regarded
as a communication system where a security requirement is
imposed on the RBC. In fact, setting
Crbc(Γ) △= Rd(Γ) ∩ {(R0, R1, Re) : Re = 0},
Crbc(Γ) defines the capacity region of a special case of
the partially cooperative RBC. Liang and Veeravalli [27]
and Liang and Krammer [28] considered the determination
problem of Crbc(Γ) and determined it for some class of relay
channels. The determination problem of Crbc(Γ) for general
Γ still remains open.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section we state our main results. Proofs of the results
are stated in Sections VI and VII.
A. Deterministic Coding Case
In this subsection we state our results on inner and outer
bounds of Rd(Γ). Let U be an auxiliary random variable
taking values in finite set U . Define the set of random triples
(U, X, S) ∈ U ×X ×S by
P1 △= {(U,X, S) : |U| ≤ |X ||S|+ 3 ,
U → XS → Y Z} ,
where U → XS → Y Z means that random variables
U, (X,S) and (Y, Z) form a Markov chain in this order. Set
R˜(in)d (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
R˜(out)d (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(XS;Y ) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
where [a]+ = max{0, a}. Set
R˜(in)d (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(in)d (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R˜(out)d (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(in)d (U,X, S|Γ) .
Then we have the following.
Theorem 1: For any relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)d (Γ) .
An essential difference between R˜(in)d (Γ) and R˜(out)d (Γ) is
a gap ∆ given by
∆
△
= I(X ;Y |ZUS)− [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]
= I(X ;ZY |US)− I(X ;Y |US) = I(X ;Z|Y US) .
Observe that
∆ = H(Z|Y US)−H(Z|Y XUS)
(a)
= H(Z|Y US)−H(Z|Y XS)
≤ H(Z|Y S)−H(Z|Y XS) = I(X ;Z|Y S) .
Equality (a) follows from the Markov condition U → XS →
Y Z . Hence, ∆ vanishes if the relay channel Γ = {Γ(z, y|x, s)
}(x,s,y,z)∈X×S×Y×Z satisfies the following:
Γ(z, y|x, s) = Γ(z|y, s)Γ(y|x, s). (2)
The above condition is equivalent to the condition that
X,S, Y, Z form a Markov chain X → SY → Z in this
order. Cover and El. Gamal [24] called this relay channel the
reversely degraded relay channel. On the other hand, we have
I(X ;Y |ZUS) = H(Y |ZUS)−H(Y |ZXUS)
≤ H(Y |ZS)−H(Y |ZXS) = I(X ;Y |ZS) , (3)
where the last inequality follows from the Markov condition
U → XSZ → Y . From (3) we can see that the quantity
I(X ;Y |ZUS) vanishes if the relay channel Γ satisfies the
following:
Γ(z, y|x, s) = Γ(y|z, s)Γ(z|x, s). (4)
Hence, if the relay channel Γ satisfies (4), then, Re should be
zero. This implies that no security on the private messages is
guaranteed. The condition (4) is equivalent to the condition
that X,S, Y, Z form a Markov chain X → SZ → Y in this
order. Cover and El. Gamal [24] called this relay channel the
degraded relay channel. Summarizing the above arguments,
we obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 1: For the reversely degraded relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)d (Γ) = Rd(Γ) = R˜(out)d (Γ) .
Corollary 2: In the deterministic coding case, if the relay
channel Γ is degraded, then no security on the private mes-
sages is guaranteed.
Corollary 1 implies that the suggested strategy in Theorem
1 is optimal in the case of reversely degraded relay channels.
Corollary 2 meets our intuition in the sense that if the
relay channel is degraded, the relay can do anything that the
destination can.
5Next we define another pair of inner and outer bounds.
Define a set of random triples (U,X, S) ∈ U ×X ×S by
P2 △= {(U,X, S) : |U| ≤ |Z||X ||S|+ 3 ,
U → XSZ → Y } .
It is obvious that P1 ⊆ P2. Set
R(in)d (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US)
+min{I(U ;Z|S), I(US;Y )} ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
R(out)d (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US)
+min{I(U ;Z|S), I(US;Y )} ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US) + I(U ;Z|XS)]+ ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} .
Furthermore, set
R(in)d (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R(in)d (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R(out)d (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P2
R(out)d (U,X, S|Γ) .
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: For any relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ R(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ) ⊆ R(out)d (Γ) .
Here we consider a class of relay channels in which Z is
a function of XS. We call this class of relay channels the
semi deterministic relay channel. If Γ is semi deterministic,
U → XS → Z for any (U,X, S) ∈ P2. On the other hand,
we have U → ZXS → Y for any (U,X, S) ∈ P2. From those
two Markov chains we have U → XS → Y Z , which implies
that R(in)d (Γ)= R(out)d (Γ). Summarizing the above argument
we have the following.
Corollary 3: If Γ belongs to the class of semi deterministic
relay channels,
R(out)d (Γ) = Rd(Γ) = R(in)d (Γ) .
Finally, we derive the third outer bound of Rd(Γ) which is
effective for a certain class of relay channels. We consider the
case where the relay channel Γ satisfies
Γ(y, z|x, s) = Γ(y|z, x, s)Γ(z|x). (5)
The above condition on Γ is equivalent to the condition that
X,S, Z satisfy the Markov chain S → X → Z . This condition
corresponds to a situation where the outputs of the relay
encoder does not directly affect the communication from the
sender to the relay. This situation can be regarded as a natural
communication link in practical relay communication systems.
In this sense we say that the relay channel Γ belongs to the
class of natural communication link or briefly the class NL if
it satisfies (5).
For given (U,X, S) ∈ U ×X ×S, set
Rˆ(out)d (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US)
+min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S) + ζ(S;Y, Z|U)} ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) + ζ(S;Y, Z|U)]+ .} ,
where we set
ζ(S;Y, Z|U) △= I(XS;Y |U)− I(XS;Z|U)
−[I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]
= I(S;Y |U)− I(S;Z|U)
= H(S|ZU)−H(S|Y U) .
The quantity ζ(S;Y, Z|U) satisfies the following.
Property 1: For any (U,X, S) ∈ P2,
ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ min{H(S|Z), I(XS;Y |Z)} .
Proof: It is obvious that ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ H(S|Z). We prove
ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ I(XS;Y |Z). We have the following chain of
inequalities:
ζ(S;Y, Z|U) = H(S|ZU)−H(S|Y U)
≤ H(S|ZU)−H(S|Y ZU) = I(S;Y |ZU)
= H(Y |ZU)−H(Y |ZUS)
≤ H(Y |Z)−H(Y |ZUS)
≤ H(Y |Z)−H(Y |ZXSU)
= H(Y |Z)−H(Y |ZXS) = I(XS;Y |Z),
where the last equality follows from the Markov condition
U → ZXS → Y.
Set
Rˆ(out)d (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
Rˆ(out)d (U,X, S|Γ) .
Our result is the following.
Theorem 3: If Γ belongs to the class NL, we have
Rd(Γ) ⊆ Rˆ(out)d (Γ) .
It is obvious that if ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ 0 for (U,X, S) ∈ P1,
we have
R(in)d (Γ) = Rd(Γ) = Rˆ(out)d (Γ).
By Property 1, the condition that
min{H(S|Z), I(XS, Y |Z)} = 0 for any (X,S) (6)
is a sufficient condition for ζ(S;Y, Z|U) to be non positive
on (U,X, S) ∈ P1. The condition (6) on Γ is very severe.
We do not have found so for any effective condition on Γ
such that ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ 0 for any (U,X, S) ∈ P1. When
|S| = 1, then by Property 1, we have ζ(S;Y, Z|U) ≤ 0.
Hence Rˆ(out)d (Γ) coincides with R(in)d (Γ). In this case, the
class NL becomes a class of general broadcast channels with
6one output and two input. Thus, the coding strategy achieving
R(in)d (Γ) in Theorem 2 is optimal in the case of BCC and
deterministic coding.
B. Stochastic Encoding Case
In this subsection we state our results on inner and outer
bounds of Rs(Γ). Set
R˜(in)s (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ R0, 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+} ,
R˜(out)s (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ R0, 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(XS;Y ) ,
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) .} .
Furthermore, set
R˜(in)s (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(in)s (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R˜(out)s (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(out)s (U,X, S|Γ) .
We further present another pair of inner and outer bounds
of Rs(Γ). To this end define sets of random quadruples
(U,V,X,S) ∈ U ×V ×X ×S by
Q1 △= {(U, V,X, S) : |U| ≤ |X ||S| + 3,
|V| ≤ (|X ||S|)2 + 4|X ||S|+ 3,
U → V → XS → Y Z,US → V → X.},
Q2 △= {(U, V,X, S) : |U| ≤ |Z||X ||S| + 3,
|V| ≤ (|Z||X ||S|)2 + 4|Z||X ||S|+ 3,
U → V → XSZ → Y, US → V X → Z,
US → V → X.}.
It is obvious that Q1 ⊆ Q2. For given (U, V,X, S) ∈ U ×V
×X ×S, set
R(U, V,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ R0, 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)},
R0 + R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |US) + min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)},
Re ≤ [I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+.}.
Furthermore, set
R(in)s (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q1
R(U, V,X, S|Γ),
R(out)s (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q2
R(U, V,X, S|Γ).
Our capacity results in the case of stochastic encoding are as
follows.
Theorem 4: For any relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)s (Γ) .
Theorem 5: For any relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)s (Γ) ⊆ R(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ) ⊆ R(out)s (Γ) .
The above two theorems together with arguments similar to
those in the case of deterministic coding yield the following
three corollaries.
Corollary 4: If the the relay channel Γ is reversely de-
graded,
R˜(in)s (Γ) = Rs(Γ) = R˜(out)s (Γ) .
Corollary 5: If the relay channel Γ is semi deterministic,
R(in)s (Γ) = Rs(Γ) = R(out)s (Γ) .
Corollary 6: If the relay channel Γ is degraded, then no
security on the private messages is guaranteed even if fn is a
stochastic encoder.
When |S| = 1, the reversely degraded relay channel
becomes the degraded broadcast channel. Wyner [4] discussed
the wire-tap channel in the case of degraded broadcast chan-
nels. Corollary 4 can be regarded as an extension of his result
to the case where wire-tapper may assist the transmission of
common messages. Corollary 6 meets our intuition in the sense
that if the relay channel is degraded, the relay can do anything
that the destination can.
C. Stochastic Relay Function
In this subsection we state our results in the case where the
relay may use a stochastic encoder. Let R∗d(Γ) and R∗s (Γ) be
denoted by the deterministic and stochastic rate equivocation
regions, respectively, in the case where the stochastic relay
encoder may be used. It is obvious that R˜(in)d (Γ) and R(in)d (Γ)
still serve as inner bounds of R∗d(Γ). Similarly, R˜(in)s (Γ) and
R(in)s (Γ) serve as inner bounds of R∗s (Γ). Our capacity results
on outer bounds in the case of stochastic relay encoder are
described in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: If Γ belongs to the class NL, R˜(out)d (Γ),
R(out)d (Γ), and Rˆ(out)d (Γ) still serve as outer bounds of
R∗d(Γ). Similarly, if Γ belongs to the class NL, R˜(out)s (Γ)
and R(out)s (Γ) still serve as outer bounds of R∗s (Γ).
IV. SECRECY CAPACITIES OF THE RCC
In this section we derive explicit inner and outer bounds of
the secrecy capacity region by using the results in the previous
section. We first consider the special case of no common
message. Define
Rd1e(Γ) △= {(R1, Re) : (0, R1, Re) ∈ Rd(Γ)} ,
Rs1e(Γ) △= {(R1, Re) : (0, R1, Re) ∈ Rs(Γ)} .
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R˜(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
R˜(out)d1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
R˜(in)s1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)
−I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
R˜(out)s1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) .} ,
R˜(in)d1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R˜(out)d1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(out)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R˜(in)s1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(in)s1e (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R˜(out)s1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
R˜(out)s1e (U,X, S|Γ) .
From Theorems 1 and 4, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 7: For any relay channel Γ,
R˜(in)d1e (Γ) ⊆ Rd1e(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)d1e (Γ) ,
R˜(in)s1e (Γ) ⊆ Rs1e(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)s1e (Γ) .
In particular, if Γ is reversely degraded,
R˜(in)d1e (Γ) = Rd1e(Γ) = R˜(out)d1e (Γ),
R˜(in)s1e (Γ) = Rs1e(Γ) = R˜(out)s1e (Γ).
Now we consider the case where Γ is reversely degraded.
In this case we compare R˜(in)d1e (Γ) = Rd1e(Γ) and R˜(in)s1e (Γ) =
Rs1e(Γ). The regions R˜(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) and R˜(in)s1e (U,X, S|Γ)
in this case are shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen from this
figure that the region R˜(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) is strictly smaller than
R˜(in)s1e (U,X, S|Γ). In R˜(in)s1e (U,X, S|Γ), the point (R∗1, R∗e)
whose components are given by
R∗1 = R
∗
e = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) (7)
belongs to Rs1e(Γ). This implies that the relay is kept com-
pletely ignorant of the private message. In this case we say
that the perfect secrecy on the private message is established.
The stochastic secrecy capacity region Css(Γ) and the secrecy
capacity Css(Γ) for the RCC are defined by
Css(Γ) △= {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) ∈ Rs(Γ)} ,
Css(Γ)
△
= max
(R1,R1)∈Rs1e(Γ)
R1 = max
(0,R1)∈Css(Γ)
R1 .
On the other hand, if we require the perfect secrecy in the
case of deterministic encoding, we must have R1 = Re for
(R1, Re) ∈ Rd1e(Γ). Then, it follows from Corollary 7 that
if Γ is reversely degraded, we must have
I(X,Z|US) = 0 for (U,X, Y ) ∈ P1. (8)
This condition is very hard to hold in general. Thus the prefect
secrecy on private message can seldom be attained by the
deterministic encoding. Another criterion of comparingRd(Γ)
and Rs(Γ) is the maximum equivocation rate in the rate-
equivocation region. For Rd(Γ) and Rs(Γ), those are formally
defined by
Cde(Γ)
△
= max
(R0,R1,Re)
∈Rd(Γ)
Re and Cse(Γ)
△
= max
(R0,R1,Re)
∈Rs(Γ)
Re,
respectively. We describe our results on Css(Γ), Cde(Γ),
Css(Γ), and Cse(Γ) which are obtained as corollaries of
Theorems 1 and 4. Set
C˜(in)ss (Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1) : R0, R1 ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ P1 .} ,
C˜(out)ss (Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1) : R0, R1 ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ P1 .} .
Then we have the following.
Corollary 8: For any relay channel Γ,
C˜(in)ss (Γ) ⊆ Css(Γ) ⊆ C˜(out)ss (Γ) .
Furthermore, we have
max
(X,S)
[I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)]+
≤ max
(U,X,S)∈P1
[I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+
≤ Cde(Γ) ≤ Css(Γ) ≤ Cse(Γ)
≤ max
(U,X,S)∈P1
I(X ;Y |ZUS) = max
(X,S)
I(X ;Y |ZS) .
In particular, if Γ is reversely degraded, we have
C˜(in)ss (Γ) = Css(Γ) = C˜(out)ss (Γ)
and
Cde(Γ) = Css(Γ) = Cse(Γ)
= max
(X,S)
[I(X ;Y |S)− I(X ;Z|S)] .
Typical shapes of the regions Rd1e(Γ) and Rs1e(Γ) in the
case of reversely degraded relay channels are shown in Fig. 4.
The secrecy capacity Css(Γ) is also shown in this figure. Next,
we state a result which is obtained as a corollary of Theorems
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2 and 5. To state this result, set
R(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= R(in)d (U,X, S|Γ) ∩ {(R0, R1, Re) : R0 = 0}
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) + min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ .},
R(out)d1e (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= R(out)d (U,X, S|Γ) ∩ {(R0, R1, Re) : R0 = 0}
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) + min{I(U ;Z|S), I(US;Y )} ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US) + I(U ;Z|XS)]+ ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ .},
R1e(U, V,X, S|Γ)
△
= R(U, V,X, S|Γ) ∩ {(R0, R1, Re) : R0 = 0}
= {(R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1 ,
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |US) + min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
Re ≤ [I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+ .},
R(in)d1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈Q1
R(in)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R(out)d1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈Q2
R(out)d1e (U,X, S|Γ) ,
R(in)s1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q1
R1e(U, V,X, S|Γ) ,
R(out)s1e (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q2
R1e(U, V,X, S|Γ) .
Furthermore, set
Cs(U, V,X, S|Γ)
△
= R(U, V,X, S|Γ) ∩ {(R0, R1, Re) : R1 = Re}
= {(R0, R1) : R0, R1 ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ [I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+ },
C(in)ss (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q1
Cs(U, V,X, S|Γ) ,
C(out)ss (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,V,X,S)∈Q2
Cs(U, V,X, S|Γ) .
From Theorems 2 and 5, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 9: For any relay channel Γ,
R(in)d1e (Γ) ⊆ Rd1e(Γ) ⊆ R(out)d1e (Γ) ⊆ R(out)s1e (Γ) ,
R(in)d1e (Γ) ⊆ R(in)s1e (Γ) ⊆ Rs1e(Γ) ⊆ R(out)s1e (Γ) ,
C(in)ss (Γ) ⊆ Css(Γ) ⊆ C(out)ss (Γ) .
Furthermore,
max
(U,X,S)∈P1
[I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+
≤ Cde(Γ)
≤ max
(U,X,S)∈P2
[I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+ ,
max
(U,V,X,S)∈Q1
[I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+
≤ Css(Γ) ≤ Cse(Γ)
≤ max
(U,V,X,S)∈Q2
[I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+ .
If Γ is semi deterministic, then
R(in)d1e (Γ) = Rd1e(Γ) = R(out)d1e (Γ) ,
R(in)s1e (Γ) = Rs1e(Γ) = R(out)s1e (Γ) ,
C(in)ss (Γ) = Css(Γ) = C(out)ss (Γ) .
Furthermore,
Cde(Γ) = max
(U,X,S)∈P1
[I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
Css(Γ) = Cse(Γ)
= max
(U,V,X,S)∈Q1
[I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US)]+ .
It can be seen from the above corollary that Cse(Γ) may
strictly be larger than Cde(Γ) unless Γ is reversely degraded.
By a simple analytical argument we can show that C(in)ss (Γ)
can be attained by S = s∗, where s∗ ∈ S is the best input
alphabet which maximizes the secrecy rate
max
(V,U,X,S=s∗)∈Q1
{I(V ;Y |US = s∗)− I(V ;Z|US = s∗)} .
This implies that the coding strategy achieving C(in)ss (Γ) does
not help improving the secrecy rate compared with the case
where the relay is simply a wire-tapper, except that the relay
may choose the best S = s∗ to benefit the receiver. Cover
and El Gamal [24] introduced a transmission scheme of the
relay called the compress-and-forward scheme, where the relay
transmits a quantized version of its received signal. This
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[19] derived an inner bound of Rs1e(Γ) in the case where the
relay employs the compress-and-forward scheme to show that
the relay may improve the secrecy capacity.
V. GAUSSIAN RELAY CHANNELS WITH CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGES
In this section we study Gaussian relay channels with con-
fidential messages, where two channel outputs are corrupted
by additive white Gaussian noises. Let (ξ1, ξ2) be correlated
zero mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix
Σ =
(
N1 ρ
√
N1N2
ρ
√
N1N2 N2
)
, |ρ| < 1 .
Let {(ξ1,i, ξ2,i)}∞i=1 be a sequence of independent identically
distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean Gaussian random vectors. Each
(ξ1,i, ξ2,i) has the covariance matrix Σ. The Gaussian relay
channel is specified by the above covariance matrix Σ. Two
channel outputs Yi and Zi of the relay channel at the ith
transmission are given by
Yi = Xi + Si + ξ1,i , Zi = Xi + ξ2,i .
It is obvious that Σ belongs to the class NL. In this class
of Gaussian relay channels we assume that the relay encoder
{gi}i=1 is allowed to be stochastic. Since (ξ1,i, ξ2,i), i =
1, 2, · · · , n have the covariance matrix Σ, we have
ξ2,i = ρ
√
N2
N1
ξ1,i + ξ2|1,i ,
where ξ2|1,i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n are zero mean Gaussian random
variable with variance (1− ρ2)N2 and independent of ξ1,i. In
particular if Σ satisfies N1 ≤ N2 and ρ =
√
N1
N2
, we have for
i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
Yi = Xi + Si + ξ1,i, Zi = Xi + ξ1,i + ξ2|1,i
which implies that for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, Zi → (Yi, Si) →
Xi. Hence, the Gaussian relay channel becomes reversely
degraded relay channel. Two channel input sequences {Xi}ni=1
and {Si}ni=1 are subject to the following average power
constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
X2i
] ≤ P1 , 1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
S2i
] ≤ P2 .
Let Rd(P1, P2|Σ) and Rs(P1, P2|Σ) be rate-equivocation
regions for the above Gaussian relay channel when we use
deterministic and stochastic encoders, respectively. To state
our results on Rd(P1, P2|Σ) and Rs(P1, P2|Σ), set
R(in)d (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ max
0≤η≤1
min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
N1
)
,
Re ≤
[
R1 − C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} ,
R(out)d (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
,
R0 + R1 ≤ C
(
P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
N1
)
,
Re ≤
[
R1 − C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 .} ,
where C(x) △= 12 log(1 + x) . Furthermore, set
R(in)s (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ max
0≤η≤1
min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
N1
)
,
Re ≤
[
C
(
θP1
N1
)
− C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} ,
R(out)s (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
R0 + R1 ≤ C
(
P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
N1
)
,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
,
Re ≤
[
C
(
θP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
− C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 .} .
Our results are the followings.
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Theorem 7: For any Gaussian relay channel Σ,
R(in)d (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ Rd(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)d (P1, P2|Σ), (9)
R(in)s (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ Rs(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)s (P1, P2|Σ). (10)
In particular, if the relay channel is reversely degraded, i.e.,
N1 ≤ N2 and ρ =
√
N1
N2
, then
R(in)d (P1, P2|Σ) = Rd(P1, P2|Σ) = R(out)d (P1, P2|Σ) ,
R(in)s (P1, P2|Σ) = Rs(P1, P2|Σ) = R(out)s (P1, P2|Σ) .
Proof of the first inclusions in (9) and (10) in the above
theorem is standard. The second inclusions in (9) and (10)
can be proved by a converse coding argument similar to the
one developed by Liang and Veeravalli [27]. Proof of Theorem
7 will be stated in Section VIII.
Next we study the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian RCCs.
Define two regions by
Rd1e(P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : (0, R1, Re) ∈ Rd(P1, P2|Σ)} ,
Rs1e(P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : (0, R1, Re) ∈ Rs(P1, P2|Σ)} .
Furthermore, define the secrecy capacity region Css(P1, P2|Σ)
and the secrecy capacity Css(P1, P2|Σ) by
Css(P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) ∈ Rs(P1, P2|Σ)} .
Css(P1, P2|Σ)
△
= max
(R1,R1)∈Rs1e(P1,P2|Σ)
R1= max
(0,R1)∈Css(P1,P2|Σ)
R1 .
Maximum equivocation rates for Rd(P1, P2|Σ) and Rs(P1,
P2|Σ) are defined by
Cde(P1, P2|Σ) △= max
(R0,R1,Re)∈Rd(P1,P2|Σ)
Re ,
Cse(P1, P2|Σ) △= max
(R0,R1,Re)∈Rs(P1,P2|Σ)
Re .
Set
R(in)d1e (P1|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
N1
)
,
Re ≤
[
R1 − C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} ,
R(out)d1e (P1|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R1 ≤ C
(
θP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
,
Re ≤
[
R1 − C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} ,
R(in)s1e (P1|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ C
(
P1
N1
)
,
Re ≤
[
C
(
P1
N1
)
− C
(
P1
N2
)]+
.} ,
R(out)s1e (P1|Σ)
△
= {(R1, Re) : R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ C
(
P1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
,
Re ≤
[
C
(
P1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
− C
(
P1
N2
)]+
.} .
Furthermore, set
C(in)ss (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1) : R0, R1 ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ max
0≤η≤1
min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
R1 ≤
[
C
(
θP1
N1
)
− C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} ,
C(out)ss (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1) : R0, R1 ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ max
0≤η≤1
min
{
C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)}
,
R1 ≤
[
C
(
θP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
− C
(
θP1
N2
)]+
,
for some 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 .} .
We obtain the following two results as a corollary of Theorem
7.
Corollary 10: For any Gaussian relay channel Σ,
R(in)d1e (P1|Σ) ⊆ Rd1e(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)d1e (P1|Σ) ,
R(in)s1e (P1|Σ) ⊆ Rs1e(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)s1e (P1|Σ) .
In particular, if N1 ≤ N2 and ρ =
√
N1
N2
, the regionsRd1e(P1,
P2|Σ) and Rs1e(P1, P2|Σ) do not depend on P2 and
R(in)d1e (P1|Σ) = Rd1e(P1|Σ) = R(out)d1e (P1|Σ) ,
R(in)s1e (P1|Σ) = Rs1e(P1|Σ) = R(out)s1e (P1|Σ) .
Corollary 11: For any Gaussian relay channel Σ,
C(in)ss (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ Css(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ C(out)ss (P1, P2|Σ) .
Furthermore,[
C
(
P1
N1
)
− C
(
P1
N2
)]+
≤ Cde(P1, P2|Σ) ≤ Css(P1, P2|Σ) ≤ Cse(P1, P2|Σ)
≤
[
C
(
P1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
− C
(
P1
N2
)]+
.
In particular, if N1 ≤ N2 and ρ =
√
N1
N2
,
C(in)ss (P1, P2|Σ) = Css(P1, P2|Σ) = C(out)ss (P1, P2|Σ)
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Fig. 5. Shapes of Rd1e(P1|Σ) and Rs1e(P1|Σ) for the reversely degraded
relay channel Σ.
and
Cde(P1, P2|Σ) = Css(P1, P2|Σ) = Cse(P1, P2|Σ)
= C
(
P1
N1
)
− C
(
P1
N2
)
.
Typical shapes of Rd1e(P1|Σ) and Rs1e(P1|Σ) for the
reversely degraded relay channel Σ are shown in Fig. 5.
Note that the secrecy capacity Css(P1, P2|Σ) for the reversely
degraded relay channel does not depend on the power con-
straint P2 at the relay. This implies that the security of private
messages is not affected by the relay. Leung-Yan-Cheong and
Hellman [29] determined the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian
wire-tap channel. The above secrecy capacity is equal to the
secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap channel derived by
them.
VI. DERIVATIONS OF THE INNER BOUNDS
In this section we prove Theorem 1, and the inclusion
R(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ) in Theorem 5.
A. Encoding and Decoding Scheme
We first state an important lemma to derive inner bounds.
To describe this lemma, we need some preparations. Let Tn,
Jn, and Ln be three message sets to be transmitted by the
sender. Let Tn,Jn, and Ln be uniformly distributed random
variable on Tn, Jn, and Ln, respectively. Elements of Tn
are directed to the receiver and relay. Encoder function fn
is a one to one mapping from Tn× Jn× Ln to Xn. Using
the decoder function ψn, the receiver outputs an element of
Tn× Jn× Ln from a received message of Yn. Using the
decoder function ϕn, the relay outputs an element of Tn from
a received message of Zn. Formal definitions of ψn and ϕn are
ψn : Yn → Tn×Jn×Ln , ϕn : Zn → Tn . Error probabilities
of decoding at the receiver and the relay are defined by
µ
(n)
1
△
= Pr{ψn(Y n) 6= (Tn, Jn, Ln)} and
µ
(n)
2
△
= Pr{ϕn(Zn) 6= Tn},
respectively. The following is a key result to derive inner
bounds of Rd(Γ) and Rs(Γ).
Lemma 1: Choose (U,X, S) ∈ P1 such that I(X ;Y |US)
≥ I(X ;Z|US). Then, there exists a sequence of quadruples
{(fn, {gi}ni=1, ψn, ϕn)}∞n=1 such that
lim
n→∞
µ
(n)
1 = limn→∞
µ
(n)
2 = 0 ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Tn| = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Jn| = I(X ;Y |US) ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Ln| = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Ln|Zn) ≥ I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) .
In this subsection we give an encoding and decoding
scheme which attains the transmission and equivocation rates
described in Lemma 1. Let
Tn = {1, 2, · · · , 2⌊nR0⌋} , Ln = {1, 2, · · · , 2⌊nr1⌋} ,
Jn = {1, 2, · · · , 2⌊nr2⌋} ,
where ⌊x⌋ stands for the integer part of x for x > 0. We
consider a transmission over B blocks, each with length n. For
each i = 1, 2, · · · , B, let (ti, ji, li) ∈ Tn× Jn× Ln be a triple
of messages to be transmitted at the ith block. A sequence
of B − 1 message triples (ti, ji, li), i = 1, 2, · · · , B − 1 are
sent over the channel in nB transmission. For i = 0, the
constant message pair (t0, j0, l0) = (1, 1, 1) is transmitted. For
fixed n, the rate triple (R0B−1B , r1
B−1
B , r2
B−1
B ) approaches
(R0, r1, r2) as B →∞.
We use random codes for the proof. Fix a joint probability
distribution of (U, S,X, Y, Z):
pUSXY Z(u, s, x, y, z)
= pS(s)pU|S(u|s)pX|US(x|u, s)Γ(y, z|x, s) ,
where U is an auxiliary random variable that stands for the
information being carried by the message to be sent to the
receiver and the relay.
Random Codebook Generation: We generate a random
code book by the following steps.
1. Set Wn △= {1, 2, · · · , 2⌊nr⌋} . Generate 2⌊nr⌋ i.i.d. s ∈
Sn each with distribution ∏ni=1 pS(si). Index s(w), w ∈
Wn.
2. For each s(w), generate 2⌊nR0⌋ i.i.d. u ∈ Un each with
distribution
∏n
i=1 pU (ui|si). Index u(w, t), t ∈ Tn.
3. For each s(w) and u(w, t), generate 2⌊nr1⌋·2⌊nr2⌋ i.i.d.
x ∈ Xn each with distribution ∏ni=1 pX|US(xi |ui, si).
Index x(w, t,j, l), (w, t,j, l) ∈ Wn ×Tn ×Jn ×Ln.
Random Partition of Tn: We define the mapping φn : Tn
→ Wn in the following manner. For each t ∈ Tn, choose
w ∈ Wn at random according to the uniform distribution on
Wn and map t to w. The random choice is independent for
each t ∈ Tn. For each w ∈ Wn, define Tn(w) △= {t ∈ Tn :
φn(t) = w} . The family of sets {Tn(w)}w∈Wn is a partition
of Tn .
Encoding: Let (ti, ji, li) be the new message triple to be
sent from the sender in block i and (ti−1, ji−1, li−1) be the
message triple to be sent from the sender in previous block
i− 1. At the beginning of block i, the sender computes wi =
φn(ti−1) and sends the codeword x(wi, ti, ji, li) ∈ Xn.
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At the beginning of block i, the relay has decoded the
message ti−1. It then computes wi = φn(ti−1) and sends
the codeword s(wi) ∈ Sn.
Decoding: Let yi ∈ Yn and zi ∈ Zn be the sequences
that the reviver and the relay obtain at the end of block i,
respectively. The decoding procedures at the end of block i
are as follows.
1. Decoder 2 at the Relay: Define
iUZ|S(u; z|s) △= log
pUZ|S(u, z|s)
pU|S(u|s)pZ|S(z|s)
,
AUZ|S,ǫ △= {(s,u, z) ∈ Sn × Un ×Zn :
1
n iUZ|S(u; z|s) > R0 + ǫ} .
The relay declares that the message tˆi is sent if there is a
unique tˆi such that(
s(wi),u(wi, tˆi), zi
) ∈ AUZ|S,ǫ .
It will be shown that the decoding error in this step is small
for sufficiently large n if R0 < I(U ;Z|S) .
2. Decoders 1a and 1b at the Receiver: Define
iSY (s;y)
△
= log
pSY (s,y)
pS(s)pY (y)
,
iUY |S(u;y|s) △= log
pUY |S(u,y|s)
pU|S(u|s)pY |S(y|s)
,
ASY,ǫ △= {(s,y) ∈ Sn × Yn :
1
n log iSY (s;y) > r + ǫ} ,
AUY |S,ǫ △= {(s,u,y) ∈ Sn × Un × Yn :
1
n iUY |S(u;y|s) + r > R0 + ǫ} .
The receiver first declares that the message wˆi is sent if there
is a unique wˆi such that (s(wˆi),yi) ∈ ASY,ǫ . It will be shown
that the decoding error in this step is small for sufficiently large
n if r < I(Y ;S) . Next, the receiver, having known wi−1 and
wˆi, declares that the message ˆˆti−1 is sent if there is a unique
ˆˆti−1 such that(
s(wi−1),u(wi−1, ˆˆti−1),yi−1
)
∈ AUY |S,ǫ
and ˆˆti−1 ∈ Tn(wˆi).
It will be shown that the decoding error in this step is small
for sufficiently large n if
R0 < I(U ;Y |S) + r
< I(U ;Y |S) + I(Y ;S) = I(US;Y ) .
3. Decoder 1c at the Receiver: Define
iXY |US(x;y|u, s) △= log
pXY |US(x,y|u, s)
pX|US(x|u, s)pY |US(y|u, s)
,
AXY |US,ǫ △= {(s,u,x,y) ∈ Sn × Un ×Xn × Yn :
1
n iXY |US(x;y|u, s) > r1 + r2 + ǫ} .
The receiver, having known wi−1, ˆˆti−1, declares that the
message pair (jˆi−1, lˆi−1) is sent if there is a unique pair
u
x
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Fig. 6. Encoding and decoding processes at the blocks i− 1, i, and i+1.
(jˆi−1, lˆi−1) such that(
s(wi−1),u(wi−1, ˆˆti−1),x(wi−1, ˆˆti−1, jˆi−1, lˆi−1),yi−1
)
∈ AXY |US,ǫ .
It will be shown that the decoding error in this step is small
for sufficiently large n if r1 + r2 < I(X ;Y |US) .
For convenience we show the encoding and decoding pro-
cesses at the blocks i− 1, i,, and i+ 1 in Fig. 6.
B. Computation of Error Probability and Equivocation Rate
In this subsection we compute error probabilities of de-
coding and equivocation rate for the encoding and decoding
scheme stated in the previous subsection. We will declare an
error in block i if one or more of the following events occurs.
E2,i: Decoder 2 fails. Let E2,i = E˜2,i ∪ Eˆ2,i, where
E˜2,i: (s(wi),u(wi, ti), zi) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ,
Eˆ2,i: ∃ tˆi 6= ti such that (s(wi), u(wi, tˆi), zi) ∈
AUZ|S,ǫ .
E1a,i: Decoder 1a fails. Let E1a,i = E˜1a,i ∪ Eˆ1a,i, where
E˜1a,i: (s(wi),yi) /∈ ASY,ǫ,
Eˆ1a,i: ∃ wˆi 6= wi such that (s(wi), yi) ∈ ASY,ǫ .
E1b,i: Decoder 1b fails. Let E1b,i = E˜1b,i ∪ Eˆ1b,i, where
E˜1b,i: (s(wi−1), u(wi−1, ti−1), yi−1) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ,
Eˆ1b,i: ∃ ˆˆti−1 6= ti−1 such that (s(wi−1), u(wi, ˆˆti−1),
yi−1) ∈ AUY |S,ǫ, ˆˆti−1 ∈ Tn(wi).
E1c,i: Decoder 1c fails. Let E1c,i = E˜1c,i ∪ Eˆ1c,i, where
E˜1c,i: (s(wi−1), u(wi−1, ti−1), xi−1(wi−1, ti−1,
ji−1, li−1), yi−1) /∈ AXY |US,ǫ,
Eˆ1c,i: ∃ (jˆi−1, lˆi−1) 6= (ji−1, li−1) such that (s(
wi−1), u(wi−1, ti−1), xi−1(wi−1, ti−1, jˆi−1,
lˆi−1), yi−1) ∈ AXY |US,ǫ .
For each i = 1, 2, · · · , B, let (Tn,i, Jn,i, Ln,i) ∈ Tn× Jn×
Ln be a message triple to be transmitted at the block i. We
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assume that (Tn,i, Jn,i, Ln,i), i = 1, 2, · · · , B are i.i.d. random
triples uniformly distributed on Tn ×Jn ×Ln. For i = 0, Tn,0,
Jn,0 and Ln,0 are constant. For i = 1, 2, · · · , B−1, define the
random variable Wn,i on Wn by Wn,i = φn(Tn,i−1). Define
the error events Fi for decoding errors in block i by
Fi: Wˆn,i 6= Wn,i or Tˆn,i 6= Tn,i or ˆˆTn,i−1 6= Tn,i−1 or
(Jˆn,i−1, Lˆn,i−1) 6= (Jn,i−1, Ln,i−1).
It is obvious that Fi ⊆ E2,i∪E1a,i∪E1b,i∪E1c,i . Define e(n)2,i
△
=
Pr
{E2,i|Fci−1} . Definitions of e(n)1a,i, e(n)1b,i, and e(n)1c,i are the
same as that of e(n)2,i . We further define sets and quantities
necessary for computation of the equivocation rate. Define
iXZ|US(x; z|u, s) △= log
pXZ|US(x, z|u, s)
pX|US(x|u, s)pZ|US(z|u, s)
,
AXZ|US,ǫ △= {(s,u,x,y) ∈ Sn × Un ×Xn ×Zn :
1
n iXZ|US(x; z|u, s) > r2 + ǫ} .
For given wi = ψn(ti−1) ∈ Wn, (ti, li) ∈ Tn×Ln and channel
output zi of s(wi) and x(wi, ti, ji, li), define the estimation
function τn : Wn ×Tn ×Ln ×Zn → Jn by τn(wi, ti, li, zi)
= jˆi if there is a unique pair (jˆi, li) such that(
s(wi),u(wi, ti),x(wi, ti, jˆi, li), zi
)
∈ AXZ|US,ǫ .
Define e(n)i
△
= Pr {τn(Wn,i, Tn,i, Ln,i, Zn) 6= Jn,i} . Let
E˜i: (s(wi−1), u(wi−1, ti−1), xi−1(wi−1, ti−1, ji−1,
li−1), zi−1) /∈ AXZ|US,ǫ,
Eˆi: ∃ jˆi−1 6= ji−1 such that (s( wi−1), u(wi−1,
ti−1), xi−1(wi−1, ti−1, jˆi−1, li−1), zi−1) ∈
AXZ|US,ǫ .
Set Ei = E˜i ∪ Eˆi. Then we have
e
(n)
i = Pr{Ei} ≤ Pr{E˜i}+ Pr{Eˆi} .
It will be shown that the error probability e(n)i of estimation
is small for sufficiently large n if r2 < I(X ;Z|US) . Set
iZ|XS(z|x, s) △= − log pZ|XS(z|x, s),
iZ|US(z|u, s) △= − log pZ|US(z|u, s),
BZ|XS,ǫ △=
{
(s,x, z) ∈ Sn ×Xn ×Zn :
1
n
iZ|XS(z|x, s) ≥ H(Z|XS)− ǫ
}
,
BZ|US,ǫ △=
{
(s,u, z) ∈ Sn × Un ×Zn :
1
n
iZ|US(z|u, s) ≤ H(Z|US) + ǫ
}
,
e
(n)
Z|XS,i
△
= Pr{s(Wn,i),x(Wn,i, Tn,i, Ln,i), Zni )
/∈ BZ|XS,ǫ} ,
e
(n)
Z|US,i
△
= Pr{(s(Wn,i),u(Tn,i), Zni ) /∈ BZ|US,ǫ} .
The operation E
[
e
(n)
2,i
]
stands for the expectation of e(n)2,i based
on the randomness of code construction. Then, we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2: For each i = 1, 2, · · · , B − 1, we have
E
[
e
(n)
2,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ
E
[
e
(n)
1a,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Y n) /∈ ASY,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ
E
[
e
(n)
1b,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Y n) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ}+ 2 · 2−nǫ
E
[
e
(n)
1c,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Xn, Y n) /∈ AXY |SU,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ
E
[
e
(n)
i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Xn, Zn) /∈ AXZ|SU,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ
E
[
e
(n)
Z|XS,i
]
= Pr{(Sn, Xn, Zn) /∈ BZ|XS,ǫ}
E
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i
]
= Pr{(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ BZ|US,ǫ} .
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A.
Next, we state a key lemma useful for the computation of the
equivocation rate. Set L(i)n
△
= (Ln,1 , Ln,2, · · · , Ln,i) . Then,
the equivocation rate over B blocks is
1
nB
H(L(B)n |ZnB) ≥
1
B
B−1∑
i=1
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB) .
For each i = 1, 2, · · · , B − 1, we estimate a lower bound
of H(Ln,i| L(i−1)n ZnB). Set Znin(i−1)+1
△
= (Zn(i−1)+1, · · · ,
Zni) . On a lower bound of H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB), we have the
following lemma.
Lemma 3: For i = 1, 2, · · · , B − 1, we have
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ r1 + r2 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
−r2e(n)i − (log |Z|)
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i + e
(n)
Z|XS,i
]
. (11)
Proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 1: Set
γmax(ǫ)
△
= max{ Pr{(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ ,
Pr{(Sn, Y n) /∈ ASY,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ ,
Pr{(Sn, Un, Y n) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ ,
Pr{(Sn, Un, Xn, Y n) /∈ AXY |SU,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ ,
Pr{(Sn, Un, Xn, Zn) /∈ AXZ|SU,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ ,
Pr{(Sn, Xn, Zn) /∈ BZ|XS,ǫ} ,
Pr{(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ BZ|US,ǫ} } .
Then, by Lemma 2, we obtain
E
[
B−1∑
i=1
{
e
(n)
2,i + e
(n)
1a,i + e
(n)
1b,i + e
(n)
1c,i + e
(n)
i
+e
(n)
Z|XS,i + e
(n)
Z|US,i
}]
=
B−1∑
i=1
{
E
[
e
(n)
2,i
]
+ E
[
e
(n)
1a,i
]
+ E
[
e
(n)
1b,i
]
+ E
[
e
(n)
1c,i
]
+E
[
e
(n)
i
]
+ E
[
e
(n)
Z|XS,i
]
+ E
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i
]}
≤ 7(B − 1)γmax(ǫ) ,
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from which it follows that there exist at least one deterministic
code such that
B−1∑
i=1
{
e
(n)
2,i + e
(n)
1a,i + e
(n)
1b,i + e
(n)
1c,i + e
(n)
i
+e
(n)
Z|XS,i + e
(n)
Z|US,i
}
≤ 7(B − 1)γ(n)max(ǫ) . (12)
From (12), we have
µ
(nB)
1 =
B−1∑
i=1
{
e
(n)
1a,i + e
(n)
1b,i + e
(n)
1c,i
}
≤ 7(B − 1)γ(n)max(ǫ) , (13)
µ
(nB)
2 =
B−1∑
i=1
e
(n)
2,i ≤ 7(B − 1)γ(n)max(ǫ) , (14)
B−1∑
i=1
e
(n)
i ≤ 7(B − 1)γ(n)max(ǫ) , (15)
B−1∑
i=1
{
e
(n)
Z|XS,i + e
(n)
Z|US,i
}
≤ 7(B − 1)γ(n)max(ǫ) . (16)
From Lemma 3, (15), and (16), we have
1
nB
H(L(B)n |ZnB)
≥ 1
B
B−1∑
i=1
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥
(
1− 1
B
)[
r1 + r2 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
]
−7
(
1− 1
B
)
[r2 + (log |Z|)]γ(n)max(ǫ) . (17)
By the weak law of large numbers, when n→∞, we have
1
n iUZ|S(U
n;Zn|Sn)→ I(U ;Z|S)
1
n iSY (S
n;Y n)→ I(S;Y )
1
n iUY |S(U
n;Y n|Sn)→ I(U ;Y |S)
1
n iXY |US(X
n;Y n|UnSn)→ I(X ;Y |US)
1
n iXZ|US(X
n;Zn|UnSn)→ I(X ;Z|US)
1
n iZ|XS(Z
n|XnSn)→ H(Z|XS)
1
n iZ|US(Z
n|UnSn)→ H(Z|US)


(18)
in probability. Fix ǫ > 0 arbitrary and choose
R0 = min{I(U ;Z|S), I(U ;Y |S) + r} − 2ǫ
r = I(S;Y )− 2ǫ
r1 = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ
r2 = I(X ;Z|US)− ǫ .

 (19)
Then, it follows from (18) and the definition of γ(n)max(ǫ) that
for the choice of (R0, r, r1, r2) in (19), we have
lim
n→∞
γ(n)max(ǫ) = 0 . (20)
For n = 1, 2, · · · , we choose block B = Bn so that Bn =⌊(
γ
(n)
max(ǫ)}
)−1/2⌋
. Define {gi}nBni=1 by
gi
△
=
{
φn, if i mod n = 0 ,
constant, otherwise .
0
I1
I0
I2
I1
I2
I0 I1
I0 +I1
+
-
-
I0
I1 I1 +
-
R
R
R
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1
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{
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Fig. 7. Shapes of Rˇ(in)s (U,X, S|Γ) and R
(in)
d
(U,X, S|Γ).
Define the sequence of block codes {(fν , {gi}νi=1, ψν , ϕν)
}∞ν=1 by
(fν , {gi}νi=1, ψν , ϕν)
△
=


constant, if 1 ≤ ν < B1 ,
(fnBn , {gi}nBni=1 , ψnBn , ϕnBn) ,
if nBn ≤ ν < (n+ 1)Bn+1 .
Combining (13), (14), (17), and (20), we have that there exists
a sequence of block codes {(fν , {gi}νi=1, ψν , ϕν)}∞ν=1 such
that
lim
ν→∞
µ
(ν)
1 = limn→∞
µ
(nBn)
1 ≤ limn→∞ 7
√
γ
(n)
max(ǫ) = 0 ,
lim
ν→∞µ
(ν)
2 = limn→∞µ
(nBn)
2 ≤ limn→∞ 7
√
γ
(n)
max(ǫ) = 0 ,
lim
ν→∞
1
ν
log |Tν | = lim
n→∞
1
nBn
log |(Tn)Bn−1|
= R0 = min{I(U ;Z|S), I(US;Y )− 2ǫ} − 2ǫ ,
lim
ν→∞
1
ν
log |Jν | = lim
n→∞
1
nBn
log |(Jn)Bn−1|
= r2 = I(X ;Z|US)− ǫ ,
lim
ν→∞
1
ν
log |Lν | = lim
n→∞
1
nBn
log |(Ln)Bn−1|
= r1 = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ ,
lim
ν→∞
1
ν
H(Lν |Zν) = lim
n→∞
1
nBn
H(L(Bn)n |ZnBn)
≥ I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)− 5ǫ .
Since ǫ can be arbitrary small, we obtain the desired result for
the above sequence of block codes. Thus, the proof of Lemma
1 is completed.
C. Proofs of the Direct Coding Theorems
In this subsection we prove R(in)d (Γ),R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ)
and R(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ) . Set
Rˇ(in)s (U,X, S|Γ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US)
+min{I(U ;Z|S), I(US;Y )} ,
Re ≤ R1 ,
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ .} ,
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and
Rˇ(in)s (Γ)
△
=
⋃
(U,X,S)∈P1
Rˇ(in)s (U,X, S|Γ) .
Proof of R(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ) and Rˇ(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ) : Set
I0
△
= min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
I1
△
= I(X ;Y |US), I2 △= I(X ;Z|US) .
We consider the case that I1 ≥ I2. The region Rˇ(U,X, S|Γ)
in this case is depicted in Fig. 7. We first prove R(in)d (Γ) ⊆
Rd(Γ). From the shape of the region R(in)d (U,X, S|Γ), it
suffices to show that for every
α ∈ [0,min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}],
the following (R0, R1, Re) is achievable:
R0 = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} − α ,
R1 = I(X ;Y |US) + α ,
Re = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) .
Choose T ′n and T ′′n such that
Tn = T ′n × T ′′n ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |T ′n| = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} − α .
We take
Mn = T ′n , Kn = T ′′n × Jn × Ln .
Then, by Lemma 1, we have
lim
n→∞
µ
(n)
1 = limn→∞
µ
(n)
2 = 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn| = I(X ;Y |US) + α ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Mn| = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} − α ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Kn|Zn) ≥ lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Ln|Zn)
≥ I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) .
To help understating the above proof, information quantities
contained in the transmitted messages are shown in Fig. 8.
Next we prove Rˇ(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ). From the shape of the
region Rˇ(in)s (U,X, S|Γ), it suffices to show that the following
(R0, R1, Re) is achievable:
R0 = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 = Re = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) .
Choose fn : Tn ×Jn ×Ln → Xn specified in Lemma 1. Set
Mn= Tn and Kn= Ln. Using this fn, for (m, k) ∈Mn×Kn
define
fn(m,Jn, k) = x(m,Jn, k) ∈ Xn .
The above fn is no longer a deterministic function. It becomes
a random function randomized by Jn uniformly distributed on
Reciever
Relay
Bits of Private 
Messages
Security
Level
n
Bits of Common 
Messages
n
n
0
n
n’
’ ’’
n
n
’’
min{I ) (Y; US , |I ) (Z; U S } |I ) (X ; Y US
|I ) (X; Z US
-
Fig. 8. Information contained in the transmitted messages.
Jn, which works as a “dummy” random variable. It is obvious
that this random function attains
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Mn| = min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn| = I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) ,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Kn|Zn) ≥ I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) ,
completing the proof.
Proof of R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ): Since R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ R(in)d (Γ),
we have R˜(in)d (Γ) ⊆ Rd(Γ).
Proof of R(in)s (Γ) ⊆ Rs(Γ): Choose (U, V,X, S) ∈ Q1.
The joint distribution of (U, V,X, S) is given by
pUV XS(u, v, x, s)
= pUSV (u, s, v)pX|V (x|v) , (u, v, x, s) ∈ U × V × X × S .
Consider the discrete memoryless channels with input alphabet
V × S and output alphabet Y × Z , and stochastic matrices
defined by the conditional distribution of (Y, Z) given V, S
having the form
Γ′(y, z|v, s) =
∑
x∈X
Γ(y, z|x, s)pX|V (x|v) .
Any encoder f ′n : Kn × Mn → Vn for this new RCC
determines a stochastic encoder fn for the original RCC by
the matrix product of f ′n with the stochastic matrix given by
pX|V = {pX|V (x|v)}(v,x)∈V×X . Both encoders yield the same
stochastic connection of messages and received sequences, so
the assertion follows by choosing the encoder f ′n used for the
proof of the inclusion Rˇ(in)s (Γ′) ⊆ Rs(Γ′).
Cardinality bounds of auxiliary random variables in P1 and
Q1 can be proved by the argument that Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[5] developed in Appendix in their paper.
VII. DERIVATIONS OF THE OUTER BOUNDS
In this section we derive the outer bounds stated in Theo-
rems 2-5. We further prove Theorem 6. We first remark here
that cardinality bounds of auxiliary random variables in P2
and Q2 in the outer bounds can be proved by the argument
that Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [5] developed in Appendix in their
paper.
The following lemma is a basis on derivations of the outer
bounds.
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Lemma 4: We assume (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ). Then, we
have
R0 ≤ 1n min{I(Mn;Y n), I(Mn;Zn)}+ δ1,n
R1 ≤ 1nI(Kn;Y n|Mn) + δ2,n
Re ≤ [R1 − I(Kn;Zn|Mn)]+ + δ3,n
Re ≤
[
1
nI(Kn;Y
n|Mn)
− 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)
]+
+ δ4,n ,


(21)
where {δi,n}∞n=1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are sequences that tend to zero
as n→∞.
The above lemma can be proved by a standard converse
coding argument using Fano’s inequality. The detail of the
proof is given in Appendix C.
We first prove Rd(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)d (Γ). As a corollary of
Lemma 4, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5: We assume that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ). Then,
R0 ≤ 1n min{I(Mn;Y n), I(Mn;Zn)}+ δ1,n
R1 ≤ 1nI(Kn;Y n|Mn) + δ2,n
R0 +R1 ≤ 1nI(KnMn;Y n) + δ˜3,n
Re ≤ [R1 − 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)]+ + δ3,n
Re ≤
[
1
nI(Kn;Y
n|Mn)
− 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)
]+
+ δ4,n ,


(22)
where δ˜3
△
= δ1,n + δ2,n.
By this lemma, it suffices to derive upper bounds of
I(Mn;Z
n), I(Mn;Y
n), I(Kn;Y
n|Mn),
I(KnMn;Y
n), I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
to prove Rd(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)d (Γ). For upper bounds of the above
five quantities, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 6: Set
Ui
△
=MnY
i−1Zi−1 , i = 1, 2, · · · , n .
For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, Ui, XiSi, and YiZi form a Markov chain
Ui → XiSi → YiZi in this order. Furthermore, we have
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(UiSi;Yi) , (23)
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si) , (24)
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi) , (25)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;YiZi|UiSi) , (26)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|ZiUiSi) . (27)
The bounds (23)-(26) also hold for any stochastic relay en-
coder. If Γ belongs to the class NL, the bound (27) also
holds for any stochastic relay encoder. If fn is a deterministic
encoder, we have
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn) ≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|UiSi) (28)
in addition to (23)-(27). If Γ belongs to the class NL, the
bound (28) also holds for any stochastic relay encoder.
Proof of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix D.
Proof of Rd(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)d (Γ) and Rs(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)s (Γ):
We first assume that (R0, R1, Re)∈ Rs(Γ). Let Q be a
random variable independent of KnMnXnY n and uniformly
distributed on {1, 2, · · · , n}. Set
X
△
= XQ, S
△
= SQ, Y
△
= YQ, Z
△
= ZQ.
Furthermore, set
U
△
= UQQ = Z
Q−1Y Q−1MnQ .
Note that UXSY Z satisfies a Markov chain U → XS → Y Z .
By Lemmas 5 and 6, we have
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y |Q), I(U ;Z|SQ)}+ δ1,n
≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ1,n
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) + δ2,n
R0 +R1 ≤ I(XS;Y |Q) + δ˜3,n
= I(XS;Y ) + δ˜3,n
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) + δ4,n .


(29)
Using memoryless character of the channel it is straight-
forward to verify that U → XS → Y Z and that the
conditional distribution of (Y, Z) given XS coincides with the
corresponding channel matrix Γ. Hence, by letting n→∞ in
(29), we obtain (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R(out)s (Γ). Next we assume
that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rd(Γ). Then by Lemmas 5 and 6, we
have
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ + δ3,n (30)
in addition to (29). Hence by letting n→∞ in (29) and (30),
we conclude that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R˜(out)d (Γ).
Next we prove the inclusions Rd(Γ) ⊆ R(out)d (Γ), Rd(Γ) ⊆
Rˆ(out)d (Γ), and Rs(Γ)⊆ R(out)s (Γ). As a corollary of Lemma
4, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: We assume that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ). Then,
R0 ≤ 1n min{I(Mn;Y n), I(Mn;Zn)}+ δ1,n
R0 +R1 ≤ 1nI(Kn;Y n|Mn)
+ 1n min{I(Mn;Y n), I(Mn;Zn)}+ δ˜3,n
Re ≤ [R1 − 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)]+ + δ3,n
Re ≤
[
1
nI(Kn;Y
n|Mn)
− 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)
]+
+ δ4,n .


(31)
From Lemma 7, it suffices to derive upper bounds of the
following five quantities:
I(Mn;Z
n), I(Mn;Y
n) ,
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) + I(Mn;Y n) = I(KnMn;Y n) ,
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) + I(Mn;Zn) , (32)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn) . (33)
Since
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) + I(Mn;Zn)
= I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn) + I(KnMn;Zn) ,
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we derive an upper bound of (32) by estimating upper bounds
of I(KnMn;Zn) and (33).
The following is a key lemma to prove Rd(Γ) ⊆ R(out)d (Γ).
Lemma 8: Set
Ui
△
= Y ni+1Z
i−1Mn , i = 1, 2, · · · , n ,
where Y ni+1 stands for Yi+1Yi+2 · · ·Yn. For i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
Ui, XiSiZi, and Yi form a Markov chain Ui → XiZiSi → Yi
in this order. Furthermore, we have
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(UiSi;Yi) , (34)
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si) , (35)
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUiSi;Yi) , (36)
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUi;Zi|Si) . (37)
The bounds (34)-(37) also hold for any stochastic relay en-
coder. If fn is a deterministic encoder, we have
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn)
≥
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)− I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} , (38)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
≤
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Yi|UiSi)− I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)} , (39)
in addition to (34)-(37). If Γ belongs to the class NL, the
bounds (38) and (39) also hold for any stochastic relay
encoder.
Proof of Lemma 8 is in Appendix E.
Proof of Rd(Γ) ⊆ R(out)d (Γ): We assume that (R0,
R1, Re)∈ Rd(Γ). Let Q, X , Y , Z , S be the same random
variables as those in the proof of Rs(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)s (Γ). Set
U
△
= UQQ = Y
n
Q+1Z
Q−1MnQ .
Note that UXSY Z satisfies a Markov chain U → XSZ → Y .
By Lemmas 7 and 8, we have
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ1,n
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US)
+min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ˜3,n
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)
+I(U ;Z|XS)]+ + δ3,n
Re ≤ [I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US)]+ + δ4,n .


(40)
By letting n → ∞ in (40), we conclude that (R0, R1, Re)
∈ R(out)d (Γ).
The following is a key lemma to prove Rd(Γ) ⊆ Rˆ(out)d (Γ).
Lemma 9: Set
Ui
△
= Y i−1Zni+1Mn , i = 1, 2, · · · , n .
For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, Ui, XiSiZi, and Yi form a Markov chain
Ui → XiZiSi → Yi in this order. Furthermore, we have
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi) , (41)
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si) , (42)
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi) , (43)
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Si) . (44)
If fn is a deterministic encoder, we have
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn)
≥
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)− I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} , (45)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
≤
n∑
i=1
{I(XiSi;Yi|Ui)− I(XiSi;Zi|Ui)
+I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Yi|UiSi)− I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)
+ζ(Si;Yi, Zi|Ui) + I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} , (46)
in addition to (41)-(44). The bounds (41),(43), and (44) also
hold for any stochastic relay encoder. If Γ belongs to the class
NL, the bound (42) also holds for any stochastic relay encoder.
If fn is deterministic and Γ belongs to the class NL, the bounds
(41)-(46) hold for any stochastic relay encoder.
Proof of Lemma 9 is in Appendix F.
Proof of Rd(Γ) ⊆ Rˆ(out)d (Γ): We assume that (R0,
R1, Re)∈ Rd(Γ). Let Q, X , Y , Z , S be the same random
variables as those in the proof Rs(Γ) ⊆ R˜(out)s (Γ). We set
U
△
= UQQ = Y
Q−1ZnQ+1MnQ .
Note that UXSY Z satisfies a Markov chain U → XSZ → Y .
Furthermore, if Γ belongs to the class NL, we have
U → XS → Z, (47)
which together with U → XSZ → Y yields
U → XS → Y Z .
By Lemmas 7 and 9, we have
R0 ≤ min{I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ1,n
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) + min{I(US;Y ),
I(U ;Z|S) + ζ(S;Y, Z|U)}+ δ˜3,n
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)
+I(U ;Z|XSQ)]+ + δ3,n
= [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ + δ3,n
Re ≤ [I(XS;Y |U)− I(XS;Z|U)
+I(U ;Z|XSQ)]+ + δ4,n
= [I(XS;Y |U)− I(XS;Z|U)]+ + δ4,n .


(48)
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Note here that since I(U ;Z|XSQ) ≤ I(U ;Z|XS) and the
Markov chain of (47), the quantity I(U ;Z|XSQ) vanishes.
By letting n → ∞ in (48), we conclude that (R0, R1, Re)
∈ Rˆ(out)d (Γ).
The following is a key result to prove Rs(Γ) ⊆ R(out)s (Γ).
Lemma 10: Let Ui, i = 1, 2, · · · , n be the same random
variables as those defined in Lemma 8. We further set Vi
△
=
UiSiKn. For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, UiViXiSiZi satisfies the follow-
ing Markov chains
Ui → Vi → XiSiZi → Yi , UiSi → ViXi → Zi ,
UiSi → Vi → Xi .
Furthermore, we have
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(UiSi;Yi) , (49)
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si) , (50)
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(ViUiSi;Yi) , (51)
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(ViUi;Zi|Si) , (52)
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{I(Vi;Yi|UiSi)− I(Vi;Zi|UiSi)} . (53)
The bounds (49)-(52) also hold for any stochastic relay en-
coder. If Γ belongs to the class NL, the bound (53) also holds
for any stochastic relay encoder.
Proof of Lemma 10 is given in Appendix E.
Proof of Rs(Γ) ⊆ R(out)s (Γ): Let Q, X , Y , Z , S, U be
the same random variables as those in the proof of Rd(Γ) ⊆
R(out)d (Γ). We further set V
△
= USKn. Note that UV XSZ
satisfies the following Markov chains
U → V → XSZ → Y , US → V X → Z ,
US → V → X .
By Lemmas 7 and 10, we have
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ1,n
R0 +R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |US)
+min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)}+ δ˜3,n
Re ≤ R1 + δ3,n
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |US)− I(V ;Z|US) + δ4,n .


(54)
By letting n → ∞ in (54), we conclude that (R0, R1, Re)
∈ R(out)s (Γ).
Proof of Theorem 6: We assume that Γ belongs to the class
NL. By Lemmas 5-10 and arguments quite parallel with the
previous arguments of the derivations of outer bounds we can
prove that R(out)d (Γ), R˜(out)d (Γ), and Rˆ(out)d (Γ) serve as outer
bounds of R∗d(Γ) and that R˜(out)s (Γ) and R(out)s (Γ) serve as
outer bounds of R∗s (Γ).
VIII. DERIVATIONS OF THE INNER AND OUTER BOUNDS
FOR THE GAUSSIAN RELAY CHANNEL
In this section we prove Theorem 7. Let (ξ1, ξ2) be a zero
mean Gaussian random vector with covariance Σ defined in
Section V. By definition, we have
ξ2 = ρ
√
N2
N1
ξ1 + ξ2|1 ,
where ξ2|1 is a zero mean Gaussian random variable with
variance (1 − ρ2)N2 and independent of ξ1. We consider the
Gaussian relay channel specified by Σ. For two input random
variables X and S of this Gaussian relay channel, output
random variables Y and Z are given by
Y = X + S + ξ1 ,
Z = X + ξ2 = X + ρ
√
N2
N1
ξ1 + ξ2|1 .
Define two sets of random variables by
P(P1, P2) △= {(U,X, S) : E[X2] ≤ P1,E[S2] ≤ P2 ,
U → XS → Y Z } ,
PG(P1, P2) △= {(U,X, S) : U,X, S are zero mean
Gaussian random variables.
E[X2] ≤ P1 ,E[S2] ≤ P2 ,
U → XS → Y Z } .
Set
R˜(in)d (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ PG(P1, P2) .} ,
R˜(out)d (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0 ,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(XS;Y ) ,
Re ≤ [R1 − I(X ;Z|US)]+ ,
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ P(P1, P2) .},
R˜(in)s (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(X ;Y |US) ,
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |US)− I(X ;Z|US) ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ PG(P1, P2) .} ,
R˜(out)s (P1, P2|Σ)
△
= {(R0, R1, Re) : R0, R1, Re ≥ 0,
R0 ≤ min{I(US;Y ), I(U ;Z|S)} ,
R0 + R1 ≤ I(XS;Y ) ,
Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(X ;Y Z|US) ,
Re ≤ I(X ;Y |ZUS) ,
for some (U,X, S) ∈ P(P1, P2) .}.
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Then we have the following.
Proposition 1: For any Gaussian relay channel we have
R˜(in)d (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ Rd(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R˜(out)d (P1, P2|Σ),
R˜(in)s (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ Rs(P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R˜(out)s (P1, P2|Σ).
Proof: The first and third inclusions in the above propo-
sition can be proved by a method quite similar to that in the
case of discrete memoryless channels. In the Gaussian case
we replace the entropy H(Z|XS) appearing in the definition
of BZ|XS,ǫ by the differential entropy h(Z|XS). Similarly,
we replace the entropy H(Z|US) appearing in the definition
of BZ|US,ǫ by the differential entropy h(Z|US). On the other
hand, Lemma 3 should be replaced by the following lemma.
Lemma 11: For any Gaussian relay channels and for i =
1, 2, · · · , B − 1, we have
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ r1 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
−
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i +
√
(P1 +N2)e
(n)
Z|US,i
]
−{12 log(2πeN2)} e(n)Z|XS,i .
Proof of this lemma is in Appendix B. Using Lemma 11,
we can prove that Lemma 2 still holds in the case of Gaussian
relay channels. Using this lemma, we can prove the first and
third inclusions in Proposition 1. We omit the detail of the
proof.
We next prove the second and fourth inclusions in Proposi-
tion 1. Let Q, X , Y , Z , S, U be the same random variables as
those in the proofs of Rd(Γ)⊆ R˜(out)d (Γ) in Theorem 1 and
Rs(Γ)⊆R˜(out)s (Γ) in Theorem 4. Note that UXSY Z satisfies
a Markov chain U → XS → Y Z . We assume that (R0,
R1, Re) ∈ Rs( P1, P2|Σ). On the power constraint on X , we
have
E
[
X2
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
X2i
] ≤ P1 .
Similarly, we obtain E
[
S2
] ≤ P2 . Hence, we have (U,X,
S) ∈ P(P1, P2). By Lemmas 5 and 6, we have (29). Hence, by
letting n → ∞, we obtain (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R˜(out)s (P1, P2|Σ) .
Next we assume that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rd(P1, P2|Σ) . We
also have (U,X, S) ∈ P(P1, P2). By Lemmas 5 and 6, we
have (29) and (30). Hence, by letting n → ∞, we obtain
(R0, R1, Re) ∈ R˜(out)d (P1, P2|Σ) .
It can be seen from Proposition 1 that to prove Theorem 7,
it suffices to prove
R(in)d (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R˜(in)d (P1, P2|Σ)
R(in)s (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R˜(in)s (P1, P2|Σ)
}
(55)
R˜(out)d (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)d (P1, P2|Σ)
R˜(out)s (P1, P2|Σ) ⊆ R(out)s (P1, P2|Σ) .
}
(56)
Proof of (55) is straightforward. To prove (56), we need some
preparations. Set
a
△
= N2−ρ
√
N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
.
Define random variables Y˜ , ξ˜1, and ξ˜2 by
Y˜
△
= aY + a¯Z ,
ξ˜1
△
= aξ1 + a¯ξ2 =
(1−ρ2)N2ξ1+(N1−ρ
√
N1N2)ξ2|1
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
,
ξ˜2
△
= ξ1 − ξ2 =
(
1− ρ
√
N2
N1
)
ξ1 − ξ2|1 .
Let N˜i = E[ξ˜2i ], i = 1, 2. Then, by simple computation we
can show that ξ˜1 and ξ˜2 are independent Gaussian random
variables and
N˜1 =
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
,
N˜2 = N1 +N2 − 2ρ
√
N1N2 .
We have the following relations between Y˜ , Y , and Z:
Y˜ = X + aS + ξ˜1
Y = Y˜ + a¯(S + ξ˜2)
Z = Y˜ − a(S + ξ˜2).

 (57)
The following is a useful lemma to prove (56).
Lemma 12: Suppose that (U,X, S) ∈ P(P1, P2). Let X(s)
be a random variable with a conditional distribution of X for
given S = s. EX(s)[·] stands for the expectation with respect
to the (conditional) distribution of X(s). Then, there exists a
pair (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that
ES
(
EX(S)X(S)
)2
= α¯P1 ,
h(Y |S) ≤ 12 log {(2πe)(αP1 +N1)} ,
h(Z|S) ≤ 12 log {(2πe)(αP1 +N2)} ,
h(Y ) ≤ 12 log
{
(2πe)(P1 + P2 + 2
√
α¯P1P2 +N1)
}
,
h(Y˜ |US) = 12 log
{
(2πe)(βαP1 + N˜1)
}
,
h(Y |US) ≥ 12 log {(2πe) (βαP1 +N1)} ,
h(Z|US) ≥ 12 log {(2πe) (βαP1 +N2)} .
Proof of Lemma 12 is given in Appendix G. Using this
lemma, we can prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: We first prove (55). Choose (U,
X, S) ∈ PG such that
E[X2] = P1, E[S
2] = P2,
U =
√
θ¯η¯P1
P2
S + U˜ , X = U + X˜,
where U˜ and X˜ are zero mean Gaussian random variables with
variance θ¯ηP1 and θP1, respectively. The random variables S,
U˜ , and X˜ are independent. For the above choice of (U,X, S),
we have
I(US;Y ) = C
(
θ¯P1+P2+2
√
θ¯η¯P1P2
θP1+N1
)
,
I(U ;Z|S) = C
(
θ¯ηP1
θP1+N2
)
,
I(X ;Y |US) = C
(
θP1
N1
)
, I(X ;Z|US) = C
(
θP1
N2
)
.
Thus, (55) is proved. Next, we prove (56). By Lemma 12, we
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have
I(US;Y ) = h(Y )− h(Y |US)
≤ C
(
(1−βα)P1+P2+2
√
α¯P1P2
βαP1+N1
)
, (58)
I(U ;Z|S) = h(Z|S)− h(Z|US)
≤ C
(
α¯P1
βαP1+N2
)
, (59)
I(XS;Y ) = h(Y )− h(Y |XS)
≤ C
(
(1−βα)P1+P2+2
√
α¯P1P2
N1
)
, (60)
I(X ;Z|US) = h(Z|US)− h(Z|XS)
≥ C
(
βαP1
N2
)
, (61)
I(X ;Y Z|US) = h(Y Z|US)− h(Y Z|XS)
= h(Y˜ Z|US)− h(Y˜ Z|XS)
= h(Y˜ |US) + h(Z|Y˜ US)
−h(Y˜ |XS)− h(Z|Y˜ XS)
(a)
= h(Y˜ |US)− h(Y˜ |XS)
= C
(
βαP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
, (62)
where (a) follows from
h(Z|Y˜ US) = h(Z|Y˜ XS) = h(Z|Y˜ S)
= 12 log
{
(2πe)a2N˜2
}
.
From (61) and (62), we have
I(X ;Y |ZUS) ≤ C
(
βαP1
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)
− C
(
βαP1
N2
)
. (63)
Here we transform the variable pair (α, β) ∈ [0, 1]2 into
(η, θ) ∈ [0, 1]2 in the following manner:
θ = βα, η = 1− α¯
θ¯
=
α− θ
1− θ . (64)
This map is a bijection because from (64), we have
α = 1− θ¯η¯ ≥ θ, β = θ
α
. (65)
Combining (58)-(60), (62), (63), and (65), we have (56).
IX. CONCLUSION
We have considered the coding problem of the RCC, where
the relay acts as both a helper and a wire-tapper. We have
derived the inner and outer bounds of the deterministic and
stochastic rate-equivocation regions of the RCC and have
established the deterministic rate region in the case where
the relay channel is reversely degraded. Furthermore, we have
computed the inner and outer bounds of the deterministic and
stochastic secrecy capacities and have determined the deter-
ministic secrecy capacity for the class of reversely degraded
relay channels. We have also evaluated the rate-equivocation
region and secrecy capacity in the case of Gaussian relay
channels.
In this paper, we have focused purely on the derivation of
information-theoretic bounds on the RCC. Problem of practical
constructions of codes achieving the derived inner bounds of
the RCC is left to us as a further study. Applications of LDPC
codes to the wire-tap channel were studied in [31]. This work
may provide some key ideas to investigate the code design
problem for the RCC.
APPENDIX
In the following arguments, X[i] stands for (X i−1, Xni+1).
Similar notations are used for other random variables.
A. Proof of Lemma 2
In this appendix we prove Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: We first derive the upper bound of
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (1|wi)
]
in Lemma 2. Set
e˜
(n)
2,i
△
= Pr{E˜2,i|Fci−1} , eˆ(n)2,i
△
= Pr{Eˆ2,i|Fci−1} ,
e˜
(n)
2,i (ti|φn(ti−1), li)
△
= Pr{E˜2,i|Fci−1, Tn,i = ti, Tn,i−1 = ti−1,
Jn,i = ji, Ln,i = li} ,
eˆ
(n)
2,i (ti|φn(ti−1))
△
= Pr{Eˆ2,i|Fci−1, Tn,i = ti, Tn,i−1 = ti−1}.
Similar notations are used for other error probabilities. By
definition of e˜(n)2,i and eˆ
(n)
2,i , we have
E
[
e
(n)
2,i
]
≤ E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i
]
+ E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i
]
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i
]
=
1
|Tn|2|Jn||Ln|
×
∑
(ti,ti−1,ji,li)
∈T 2n×Jn×Ln
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i (ti|φn(ti−1), ji, li)
]
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i
]
=
1
|Tn|2
∑
(ti,ti−1)∈T 2n
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (ti|φn(ti−1))
]
.


(66)
By the symmetrical property of random coding, it suffices to
evaluate E[e˜(n)2,i (1|φn(ti−1), 1, 1)] and E[eˆ(n)2,i (1|φn(ti−1))].
Note that
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i (1|φn(ti−1), 1, 1)
]
=
∑
wi∈Wn
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i (1|wi, 1, 1)
∣∣∣φn(ti−1) = wi] 1|Wn| , (67)
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (1|φn(ti−1))
]
=
∑
wi∈Wn
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(ti−1) = wi] 1|Wn| . (68)
On E[e˜(n)2,i (1|wi, 1, 1) |φn(ti−1) = wi], we have the following.
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i (1|wi, 1, 1)
∣∣∣φn(ti−1) = wi]
=
∑
(s(wi),u(wi,1),
zi)/∈AUZ|S,ǫ
∑
x(wi,1,1,1)∈Xn
pS(s(wi))pU|S(u(wi, 1)|s(wi))
×pX|US(x(wi, 1, 1, 1)|u(wi, 1), s(wi))
×pZ|XS(zi|x(wi, 1, 1, 1), s(wi))
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=
∑
(s(wi),u(wi,1),
zi)/∈AUZ|S,ǫ
pS(s(wi))pUZ|S(u(wi, 1), zi|s(wi))
= Pr
{
(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ
}
. (69)
From (67) and (69), we have
E
[
e˜
(n)
2,i (1|φn(ti−1), 1)
]
= Pr
{
(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ
}
.
(70)
On E[eˆ(n)2,i (1|wi) |φn(ti−1) = wi], we have the following.
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(ti−1) = wi]
≤
∑
tˆi 6=1
∑
(s(wi),u(wi,tˆi),
zi)∈AUZ|S,ǫ
pS(s(wi))pU|S(u(wi, tˆi)|s(wi))
×pZ|S(zi|s(wi))
(a)
≤
∑
tˆi 6=1
∑
(s(wi),u(wi,tˆi),
zi)∈AUZ|S,ǫ
pS(s(wi))pUZ|S(u(wi, ti), zi|s(wi))
×2−n[R0+ǫ]
=
∑
tˆi 6=1
2−n[R0+ǫ]
∑
(s(wi),u(wi,tˆi),
zi)∈AUZ|S,ǫ
pSUZ(s(wi),u(wi, tˆi), zi)
≤ 2−n[R0+ǫ](2nR0 − 1) ≤ 2−nǫ . (71)
Step (a) follows from the definition of AUZ|S,ǫ. From (68)
and (71), we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i (1|φn(ti−1))
]
≤ 2−nǫ . (72)
Hence, form (66), (70), and (72) we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
2,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Zn) /∈ AUZ|S,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ .
In a manner quite similar to the above argument, we can derive
the upper bounds of E
[
e
(n)
1a,i
]
and E
[
e
(n)
1c,i
]
stated in Lemma
2.
Next, we derive the upper bound of E
[
e
(n)
1b,i
]
. By definition
of e˜(n)1b,i and eˆ
(n)
1b,i, we have
E
[
e
(n)
1b,i
]
≤ E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i
]
+ E
[
e˜
(n)
1b,i
]
E
[
e˜
(n)
1b,i
]
=
1
|Tn|2|Ln|
×
∑
(ti−1,ti−2,
li−1)∈T 2n×Ln
E
[
e˜
(n)
1b,i(ti−1|φn(ti−2), li−1)
]
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i
]
=
1
|Tn|2
∑
(ti−1,ti−2)∈T 2n
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(ti−1|φn(ti−2))
]
.


(73)
By the same argument as that of the derivation of (70), we
have
E
[
e˜
(n)
1b,i(ti−1|φn(ti−2), li−1)
]
= Pr
{
(Sn, Un, Y n) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ
} (74)
for any (ti−1, ti−2, li−1) ∈ T 2n × Ln. Then, from (73) and
(74), we have
E
[
e˜
(n)
1b,i
]
= Pr
{
(Sn, Un, Y n) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ
}
. (75)
Next, we evaluate E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(ti−1|φn(ti−2))
]
. By the symmet-
rical property of random coding, it suffices to evaluate the
above quantity for (ti−1, ti−2) = (1, 1) or (1, 2). When
(ti−1, ti−2) = (1, 1), set φn(1) = wi. Then, we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|φn(1))
]
= E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi)
]
≤
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1
∑
wi∈Wn
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi]
×Pr
{
φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi
}
=
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1
∑
wi∈Wn
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi]
× 1|Wn|2 . (76)
On upper bound of
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi] ,
we have the following chain of inequalities:
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn(ˆtˆi−1) = wi]
≤
∑
(s(wi),u(wi ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi))
×pU|S(u(wi, ˆˆti−1)|s(wi))pY |S(yi|s(wi))
(a)
≤
∑
(s(wi),u(wi ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi))
×pUY |S(u(wi, ˆˆti−1),yi−1|s(wi))2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
= 2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
×
∑
(s(wi),u(wi ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pSUY (s(wi),u(wi,
ˆˆti−1),yi−1)
≤ 2−n[R0−r+ǫ] . (77)
Step (a) follows from the definition of AUY |S,ǫ. It follows
from (76) and (77) that when (ti−1, ti−2) = (1, 1), we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|φn(1))
]
≤
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1
∑
wi∈Wn
2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
|Wn|2
≤ (2nR0 − 1)2
−n[R0−r+ǫ]
|Wn| ≤ 2 · 2
−nǫ . (78)
When (ti−1, ti−2) = (1, 2), set φn(1) = wi and φn(2) =
wi−1. Then, we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|φn(2))
]
= E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
]
≤
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1
∑
(wi,wi−1)∈W2n
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1)
= wi,
φn(2) = wi−1
]
×Pr
{
φn(1) = φn(ˆtˆi−1) = wi, φn(2) = wi−1
}
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=
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1,2
∑
(wi,wi−1)∈W2n
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1)
= wi,
φn(2) = wi−1
]
× 1|Wn|3
+
∑
wi=wi−1∈Wn
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn(2) = wi,
φn(2) = wi−1
]
× 1|Wn|2 . (79)
On upper bound of
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi, φn(2) = wi−1] ,
we have the following chain of inequalities:
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn (ˆtˆi−1) = wi, φn(2) = wi−1]
≤
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1 ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi−1))
×pU|S(u(wi−1, ˆˆti−1)|s(wi−1))pY |S(yi|s(wi−1))
(a)
≤
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1 ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi−1))
×pUY |S(u(wi−1, ˆˆti−1),yi−1|s(wi−1))2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
= 2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
×
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1 ,ˆtˆi−1),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pSUY (s(wi−1),u(wi−1,
ˆˆti−1),yi−1)
≤ 2−n[R0−r+ǫ] . (80)
Step (a) follows from the definition of AUY |S,ǫ. On upper
bound of
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn(2) = wi, φn(2) = wi−1] ,
we have the following chain of inequalities:
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|wi−1)
∣∣∣φn(1) = φn(2) = wi, φn(2) = wi−1]
=
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1,2),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi−1))
×pU|S(u(wi−1, 2)|s(wi−1))pY |S(yi|s(wi−1))
(a)
≤
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1,2),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pS(s(wi−1))
×pUY |S(u(wi−1, 2),yi−1|s(wi−1))2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
= 2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
×
∑
(s(wi−1),u(wi−1,2),
yi−1)∈AUY |S,ǫ
pSUY (s(wi−1),u(wi−1, 2),yi−1)
≤ 2−n[R0−r+ǫ] . (81)
Step (a) follows from the definition of AUY |S,ǫ. It follows
from (79)-(81) that when (ti−1, ti−2) = (1, 2), we have
E
[
eˆ
(n)
1b,i(1|φn(2))
]
≤
∑
ˆˆti−1 6=1,2
∑
(wi,wi−1)∈W2n
2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
|Wn|3
+
∑
wi=wi−1∈Wn
2−n[R0−r+ǫ]
|Wn|2
= (2nR0 − 1)2
−n[R0−r+ǫ]
|Wn| ≤ 2 · 2
−nǫ . (82)
From (73), (75), (78), and (82), we have
E
[
e
(n)
1b,i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Y n) /∈ AUY |S,ǫ}+ 2 · 2−nǫ .
To derive the upper bound of E
[
e
(n)
i
]
in Lemma 2, set
e˜
(n)
i
△
= Pr{E˜i} , eˆ(n)i
△
= Pr{Eˆi} ,
e˜
(n)
i (ji|φn(ti−1), ti, li)
△
= Pr{E˜i|Tn,i = ti, Tn,i−1 = ti−1, Jn,i = ji, Ln,i = li} ,
eˆ
(n)
i (ji|φn(ti−1), ti, li)
△
= Pr{Eˆi|Tn,i = ti, Tn,i−1 = ti−1, Jn,i = ji, Ln,i = li} .
By definition of e˜(n)i and eˆ
(n)
i , we have
E
[
e
(n)
i
]
≤ E
[
eˆ
(n)
i
]
+ E
[
e˜
(n)
i
]
E
[
e˜
(n)
i
]
=
1
|Tn|2|Jn||Ln|
×
∑
(ti,ti−1,ji,li)
∈T 2n×Jn×Ln
E
[
e˜
(n)
i (ji|φn(ti−1), ti, li)
]
E
[
eˆ
(n)
i
]
=
1
|Tn|2|Jn||Ln|
×
∑
(ti,ti−1,ji,li)
∈T 2n×Jn×Ln
E
[
eˆ
(n)
i (ji|φn(ti−1), ti, li)
]
.


(83)
By the symmetrical property of random coding it suffices
to evaluate E[e˜(n)i (1|φn( ti−1), 1, 1)] and E[eˆ(n)i (1|φn(
ti−1), 1, 1)]. In a manner quite similar to that of the derivation
of the upper bound of E[e˜(n)2,i (1|φn(ti−1) , 1, 1)] and E[e˜(n)2,i
(1|φn(ti−1))], we obtain
E[e˜
(n)
i (1|φn(ti−1), 1, 1)]
= Pr
{
(Sn, Un, Xn, Zn) /∈ AXZ|US,ǫ
}
E[eˆ
(n)
i (1|φn(ti−1), 1, 1)] ≤ 2−nǫ .
Hence we have
E
[
e
(n)
i
]
≤ Pr{(Sn, Un, Xn, Zn) /∈ AXZ|US,ǫ}+ 2−nǫ .
By an argument quite similar to that of the derivation of (70),
we can prove the formulas of E
[
e
(n)
ZX|S,i
]
and E
[
e
(n)
ZU|S,i
]
stated in Lemma 2. We omit the proofs.
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B. Proofs of Lemmas 3 and 11
Proof of Lemma 3: On a lower bound of H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n
ZnB), we have the following chain of inequalities:
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
= H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
−H(Jn,i|Ln,iL(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
≥ H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
−H(Jn,i|Zn(i+1)ni+1 Wn,iTn,iLn,i). (84)
By Fano’s inequality, we have
1
n
H(Jn,i|Zn(i+1)ni+1 Wn,iTn,iLn,i) ≤ r2e(n)i +
1
n
. (85)
From (84) and (85), we have
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)− nr2e(n)i − 1 . (86)
On the first quantity in the right members of (86), we have
the following chain of inequalities:
H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
= H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,i)
−I(Znin(i−1)+1; Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,i)
= H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,i)
+H(Znin(i−1)+1|ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,iJn,iL(i)n )
−H(Znin(i−1)+1|ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,iJn,iL(i−1)n )
= log (|Jn| |Ln|) +H(Znin(i−1)+1|ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,iJn,iL(i)n )
−H(Znin(i−1)+1|L(i−1)n ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,iJn,i)
≥ n(r1 + r2)− 2 +H(Znin(i−1)+1|ZnB[i] Wn,iTn,iJn,iL(i)n )
−H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i)
(a)
= n(r1 + r2) +H(Z
ni
n(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i)
−H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i)− 2 . (87)
Equality (a) follows from the following Markov chain:
Znin(i−1)+1 →Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i → ZnB[i] L(i−1)n .
To derive a lower bound of H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,i, Ln,i),
set
B∗1
△
= {(w, t, j, l, z) :
(s(w),x(w, t, j, l), z) ∈ BZ|XS,ǫ
}
.
By definition of B∗1 , if (w, t, j, l, z) ∈ B∗1 , we have
− 1
n
log pZ|XS(z|x(w, t, j, l), s(w)) ≥ H(Z|XS)− ǫ .
By definition of e(n)Z|XS,i, we have
Pr{(Wn,i, Tn,i, Jn,i, Ln,i, Znin(i−1)+1) /∈ B∗1} = e(n)Z|XS,i .
Then, we have
H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i)
≥ n[H(Z|XS)− ǫ]
×Pr{(Wn,i, Tn,i, Jn,i, Ln,i, Znin(i−1)+1) ∈ B∗1}
≥ n[H(Z|XS)− ǫ](1− e(n)Z|XS,i)
≥ n[H(Z|XS)− ǫ]− nH(Z|XS)e(n)Z|XS,i . (88)
To derive an upper bound of H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i), set
B∗2
△
=
{
(w, t, z) : (s(w),u(w, t), z) ∈ BZ|US,ǫ
}
.
By definition of B∗2 , if (w, t, z) ∈ B∗2 , we have
− 1
n
log pZ|US(z|u(w, t), s(w)) ≤ H(Z|US) + ǫ .
By definition of e(n)Z|US,i, we have
Pr{(Wn,i, Tn,i, Znin(i−1)+1) /∈ B∗2} = e(n)Z|US,i .
Set
D △= {(w, t) : (w, t, z) ∈ (B∗2)c for some z}
and for (w, t) ∈ D, set
D(w, t) △= {z : (w, t, z) ∈ (B∗2)c} .
Then, we have
H(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i)
≤ n[H(Z|US) + ǫ]−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
× log pZn|WnTn(z|w, t) . (89)
We derive an upper bound of the second term in the right
member of (89). Let Z¯ be a random variable uniformly dis-
tributed on Z . Let Z¯n = (Z¯1, Z¯2, · · · , Z¯n) be n independent
copies of Z¯ . We assume that Z¯n is independent of Wn and
Tn. We first observe that
−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log
pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)
pZ¯n(z)
=
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log
pZ¯n(z)
pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)
(a)
≤ (log e) ·
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
×
[
pZ¯n(z)
pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)
− 1
]
= (log e) ·
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
[pZ¯n(z)pWnTn(w, t)
−pZnWnTn(z, w, t)]
= (log e) · [pZ¯nWnTn (B∗2)− pZnWnTn (B∗2)] ≤ log e . (90)
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Step (a) follows from the inequality log a ≤ (log e)(a − 1).
From (90), we have
−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)
≤ −
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log pZ¯n(z) + log e
= n
∑
(w,t)∈D
∑
z∈D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log |Z|+ log e
= ne
(n)
Z|US,i log |Z|+ log e . (91)
Combining (86)-(89) and (91), we have
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ r1 + r2 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
−
[
(log |Z|)e(n)Z|US,i +H(Z|XS)e
(n)
Z|XS,i
]
,
≥ r1 + r2 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
−r2e(n)i − (log |Z|)
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i + e
(n)
Z|XS,i
]
,
completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 11: In a manner quite similar to the
derivation of (86) and (87) in the proof of Lemma 3, we have
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)− nr2e(n)i − 1, (92)
H(Jn,iLn,i|L(i−1)n ZnBWn,iTn,i)
≥ n(r1 + r2) + h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i)
−h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i)− 2. (93)
On a lower bound of h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i), we have
h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,iJn,iLn,i)
≥ n[h(Z|XS)− ǫ]
×Pr{(Wn,i, Tn,i, Jn,i, Ln,i, Znin(i−1)+1) ∈ B∗1}
≥ n[h(Z|XS)− ǫ](1− e(n)Z|XS,i)
≥ n[h(Z|XS)− ǫ]− nh(Z|XS)e(n)Z|XS,i
= n[h(Z|XS)− ǫ]− n{12 log(2πeN2)} e(n)Z|XS,i . (94)
Next, we derive an upper bound of h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i).
By definition of B∗2 , if (w, t, z) ∈ B∗2 , we have
− 1
n
log pZ|US(z|u(w, t), s(w)) ≤ h(Z|US) + ǫ .
Then we have
h(Znin(i−1)+1|Wn,iTn,i)
≤ n[h(Z|US) + ǫ]−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
× log pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)dz . (95)
We derive an upper bound of the second term in the right
member of (95). Let Z¯ be a random variable whose density
function denoted by pZ¯(z) is
pZ¯(z) =
1
2
e−|z| .
Let Z¯n = (Z¯1, Z¯2, · · · , Z¯n) be n independent copies of Z¯ . We
assume that Z¯n is independent of Wn and Tn. For z
△
= (z1,
z2, · · · , zn), the density function pZ¯n(z) of Z¯n is
pZ¯n(z) =
(
1
2
)n n∏
i=1
e−|zi| .
In a manner quite similar to the derivation of (90) in the proof
of Lemma 3, we have
−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log
pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)
pZ¯n(z)
dz
≤ log e . (96)
From (96), we have
−
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log pZn|WnTn(z|w, t)dz
≤ −
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t) log pZ¯n(z)dz + log e
= n


∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)dz

+ log e
+
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|
}
dz . (97)
On the last term in (97), we have the following chain of
inequalities:
∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|
}
dz
(a)
≤
∑
(w,t)∈D
{∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)dz
} 1
2
×


∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|
}2
dz


1
2
(b)
≤


∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)dz


1
2
×


∑
(w,t)∈D
∫
D(w,t)
pZnWnTn(z, w, t)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|
}2
dz


1
2
≤
√
e
(n)
Z|US,i


∫
pZn(z)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|
}2
dz


1
2
(c)
≤
√
e
(n)
Z|US,i
{
n
∫
pZn(z)
{
n∑
i=1
|zi|2
}
dz
} 1
2
=
√
e
(n)
Z|US,i
{
n
n∑
i=1
∫
z2i pZi(zi)dzi
} 1
2
. (98)
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Steps (a)-(c) follow from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. On
the other hand, we have
n∑
i=1
∫
z2i pZi(zi)dzi =
n∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi + ξ2,i|2
]
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
|Xi|2
]
+
n∑
i=1
E
[
|ξ2,i|2
]
≤ n(P1 +N2) . (99)
Combining (92)-(95) and (97)-(99), we have
1
n
H(Ln,i|L(i−1)n ZnB)
≥ r1 + r2 − I(X ;Z|US)− 2ǫ− 3 + log e
n
−r2e(n)i −
[
e
(n)
Z|US,i +
√
(P1 +N2)e
(n)
Z|US,i
]
−{12 log(2πeN2)} e(n)Z|XS,i ,
completing the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4: We first observe that we have the
following chains of inequalities:
log |Mn| = H(Mn)
= I(Mn;Y
n) +H(Mn|Y n) (100)
= I(Mn;Z
n) +H(Mn|Zn) , (101)
log |Kn| = H(Kn) = H(Kn|Mn)
= I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) +H(Kn|Y nMn) , (102)
H(Kn|Zn) = H(Kn|ZnMn) + I(Kn;Mn|Zn)
= H(Kn|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+I(Kn;Mn|Zn)
= I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+H(Kn|Y nMn) + I(Kn;Mn|Zn)
≤ I(Kn;Y n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+H(Kn|Y nMn) +H(Mn|Zn) , (103)
≤ log |Kn| − I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+H(Kn|Y nMn) +H(Mn|Zn) . (104)
Here, we suppose that (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ). Set λ(n)
△
=
max{λ(n)1 , λ(n)2 }. Then, by Fano’s inequality we have
H(Mn|Y n) ≤ log |Mn|λ(n) + 1
H(Mn|Zn) ≤ log |Mn|λ(n) + 1
H(Kn|Y nMn) ≤ log |Kn|λ(n) + 1 .

 (105)
Set
τ1,n
△
= 1n log |Mn|λ(n) + 1n
τ2,n
△
= 1n log |Kn|λ(n) + 1n .
}
From (100)-(105), we have
1
n log |Mn| ≤ 1n min{I(Mn;Y n), I(Mn;Zn)}+ τ1,n
1
n log |Kn| ≤ 1nI(Kn;Y n|Mn) + τ2,n
1
nH(Kn|Zn) ≤ 1n log |Kn| − 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+τ1,n + τ2,n
1
nH(Kn|Zn) ≤ 1nI(Kn;Y n|Mn)− 1nI(Kn;Zn|Mn)
+τ1,n + τ2,n.


(106)
Set
δ1,n
△
= τ1,n +
[
R0 − 1n log |Mn|
]+
δ2,n
△
= τ2,n +
[
R1 − 1n log |Kn|
]+
δ3,n
△
= τ1,n + τ2,n +
[
Re − 1nH(Kn|Zn)
]+
+
[
1
n log |Kn| −R1
]+
δ4,n
△
= τ1,n + τ2,n +
[
Re − 1nH(Kn|Zn)
]+
.


(107)
It is obvious that when (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ), the above δi,n,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 tend to zero as n → ∞. From (106) and (107),
we have (21) for (R0, R1, Re) ∈ R∗s (Γ).
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6: We first prove (23) and (24). We have
the following chains of inequalities:
I(Mn;Y
n) = H(Y n)−H(Y n|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1Mn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1Zi−1SiMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(UiSi;Yi) ,
I(Mn;Z
n) = H(Mn)−H(Mn|Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Mn|Zi−1)−H(Mn|Zi)
}
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Mn|Zi−1Si)−H(Mn|Zi)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Mn|Zi−1Si)−H(Mn|ZiSi)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Mn;Zi|Zi−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Si)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiMn)
} (108)
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|Y i−1Zi−1SiMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si) .
Step (a) follows from Si → Mn → Zi−1. Next, we prove
26
(25). We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(KnMn;Y
n)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Y n) =
n∑
i=1
I(Yi;X
n|Y i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1Xn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1XnSi)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi)−H(Yi|XiSi)} =
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi)
Step (a) follows from Y n → Xn → KnMn. Step (b) follows
from Yi → XiSi → Y i−1X[i] . Thirdly, we prove (26). We
have the following chain of inequalities:
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn) ≤ I(Kn;Y nZn|Mn)
= I(KnMn;Y
nZn|Mn)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Y nZn|Mn)
= H(Xn|Mn)−H(Xn|Y nZnMn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Y i−1Zi−1Mn)−H(Xn|Y iZiMn)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Y i−1Zi−1MnSi)−H(Xn|Y iZiMn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Y i−1Zi−1MnSi)−H(Xn|Y iZiMnSi)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xn;YiZi|UiSi)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(YiZi|UiSi)−H(YiZi|UiSiXn)}
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(YiZi|UiSi)−H(YiZi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;YiZi|UiSi) .
Step (a) follows from the Markov chain Y nZn → Xn →
KnMn. Step (b) follows from Si → Zi−1 → XnY i−1Mn.
Step (c) follows from YiZi → XiSi → UiX[i] . Fourthly, we
prove (27). We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
≤ I(Kn;Y nZn|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
= I(Kn;Y
n|ZnMn) = I(KnMn;Y n|ZnMn)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Y n|ZnMn)
= H(Y n|ZnMn)−H(Y n|ZnXnKnMn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1ZnMn)−H(Yi|Y i−1ZnXn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1ZiMn)−H(Yi|Y i−1ZnSiXn)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1ZiSiMn)−H(Yi|Y i−1ZnSiXn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi|UiSiZi)−H(Yi|UiSiZnSiXn)}
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi|UiSiZi)−H(Yi|UiSiZiXi)}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi|ZiUiSi) .
Step (a) follows from the Markov chain Y nZn → Xn →
KnMn. Step (b) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a
function of Zi−1 in the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to
be deterministic. In the case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be
stochastic, if Γ belongs to the class NL, we have the following
Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → Y iZiKnMn . (109)
Step (b) follows from the above Markov chain. Step (c) follows
from Yi → ZiXiSi → Y i−1Z[i]X[i] . Finally, we prove (28).
We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn) = H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|KnMn)
(a)
= H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Mn)−H(Zi|Zi−1Xn)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1SiMn)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiXn)
}
≥
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|UiSi)−H(Zi|XiSi)}
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|UiSi)−H(Zi|XiSiUi)}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|UiSi) .
Step (a) follows from that fn is a one-to-one mapping. Step
(b) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1 in
the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In the
case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiMnXn . (110)
Step (b) follows from the above Markov chain. Step (c) follows
from Zi → XiSi→ Ui . Thus, the proof of Lemma 6 is
completed.
E. Proofs of Lemmas 8 and 10
In this appendix we prove Lemmas 8 and 10. We first
present a lemma necessary to prove those lemmas.
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Lemma 13:
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1SiMn;Yi) , (111)
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1Mn;Zi|Si) , (112)
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1SiKnMn;Yi) , (113)
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1KnMn;Zi|Si) , (114)
I(Y n;Kn|Mn)− I(Zn;Kn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
I(Kn;Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1MnSi)
−I(Kn;Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1MnSi)
}
. (115)
Proof: We first prove (111) and (112). We have the follow-
ing chains of inequalities:
I(Mn;Y
n) =
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y ni+1)−H(Yi|Y ni+1Mn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1SiMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1SiMn;Yi),
I(Mn;Z
n)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Si)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiMn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1SiMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1Mn;Zi|Si) .
Step (a) follows from (108). Next, we prove (113) and (114).
We have the following chains of inequalities:
I(KnMn;Y
n) = H(Y n)−H(Y n|KnMn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y ni+1)−H(Yi|Y ni+1KnMn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1SiKnMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1SiKnMn;Yi) ,
I(KnMn;Z
n)
= H(KnMn|Zn)−H(KnMn|Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(KnMn|Zi−1)−H(KnMn|Zi)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(KnMn|Zi−1)−H(KnMn|ZiSi)
}
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(KnMn|Zi−1Si)−H(KnMn|ZiSi)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(KnMn;Zi|Zi−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Si)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiKnMn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1SiKnMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y ni+1Z
i−1KnMn;Zi|Si) .
Step (a) follows from Si → Zi−1 → KnMn. Finally, we
prove (115). We first observe the following two identities:
H(Y n|Mn)−H(Zn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1Mn)−H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1Mn)
}
, (116)
H(Y n|KnMn)−H(Zn|KnMn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1KnMn)
−H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1KnMn)
}
. (117)
Those identities follow from an elementary computation based
on the chain rule of entropy. Subtracting (117) from (116), we
have
I(Y n;Kn|Mn)− I(Zn;Kn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
I(Kn;Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1Mn)
−I(Kn;Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1Mn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
{−H(Kn|Y ni Zi−1Mn) +H(Kn|Y ni+1ZiMn)}
≤
n∑
i=1
{−H(Kn|Y ni Zi−1MnSi) +H(Kn|Y ni+1ZiMn)}
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
{−H(Kn; |Y ni Zi−1MnSi) +H(Kn|Y ni+1ZiMnSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{
I(Kn;Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1MnSi)
−I(Kn;Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1MnSi)
}
.
Step (a) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1
in the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In
the case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiY ni+1KnMn. (118)
Step (a) follows from the above Markov chain.
Next, we present a lemma necessary to prove Lemma 8.
Lemma 14: For any sequence {Ui}ni=1 of random vari-
ables, we have
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUiSi;Yi) , (119)
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUi;Zi|Si) . (120)
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Proof: We first prove (119). We have the following chain
of inequalities:
I(KnMn;Y
n)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Y n) = H(Y n)−H(Y n|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1Xn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1XnSi)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi)−H(Yi|XiSi)}
≤
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi)−H(Yi|XiUiSi)} =
n∑
i=1
I(XiUiSi;Yi) .
Step (a) follows from the Markov chain Y n → Xn → KnMn.
Step (b) follows from Yi → XiSi → Y i−1X[i] . Next, we
prove (120). We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(KnMn;Z
n)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;Zn) = H(Xn)−H(Xn|Zn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Zi−1)−H(Xn|Zi)}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Zi−1)−H(Xn|ZiSi)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Xn|Zi−1Si)−H(Xn|ZiSi)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xn;Zi|Zi−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Si)−H(Zi|ZiXnSi)
}
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|XiSi)}
≤
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|XiUiSi)} =
n∑
i=1
I(XiUi;Zi|Si) .
Step (a) follows from the Markov chain Zn → Xn → KnMn.
Step (b) follows from Si → Zi−1 → Xn. Step (c) follows
from Zi → XiSi → Zi−1X[i] . Thus, the proof of Lemma 14
is completed.
Proof of Lemma 8: Set Ui = Y ni+1Zi−1Mn. It can easily
be verified that Ui, XiSiZi, Yi form a Markov chain Ui →
XiSiZi → Yi in this order. From (111), (112), and (115) in
Lemma 13, we obtain
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(UiSi;Yi),
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si),
and
I(Y n;Kn|Mn)− I(Zn;Kn|Mn)
≤
n∑
i=1
{I(Kn;Yi|UiSi)− I(Kn;Zi|UiSi)} , (121)
respectively. From (119), (120) in Lemma 14, we obtain
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUiSi;Yi),
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiUi;Zi|Si),
respectively. It remains to evaluate an upper bound of
I(Kn;Yi|UiSi)− I(Kn;Zi|UiSi) .
We have the following chain of inequalities:
I(Kn;Yi|UiSi)− I(Kn;Zi|UiSi)
= H(Yi|UiSi)−H(Yi|KnMnUiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi) +H(Zi|KnMnUiSi)
(a)
= H(Yi|UiSi)−H(Yi|XnUiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi) +H(Zi|XnUiSi)
= H(Yi|UiSi)
−H(Yi|ZiXnUiSi)− I(Yi;Zi|XnUiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi)
+H(Zi|YiXnUiSi) + I(Yi;Zi|XnUiSi)
= H(Yi|UiSi)−H(Yi|ZiXnUiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi) +H(Zi|YiXnUiSi)
(b)
= H(Yi|UiSi)−H(Yi|ZiXiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi) +H(Zi|YiXnUiSi)
≤ H(Yi|UiSi)−H(Yi|ZiXiUiSi)
−H(Zi|UiSi) +H(Zi|YiXiUiSi)
= I(Yi;ZiXi|UiSi)− I(Zi;YiXi|UiSi)
= I(Xi;Yi|UiSi)− I(Xi;Zi|UiSi) .
Step (a) follows from Xn = fn(Kn,Mn) and fn is a one-
to-one mapping. Step (b) follows from Yi → ZiXiSi →
UiX[i] . Finally, we prove (38). We have the following chain
of inequalities:
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn) = H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|KnMn)
(a)
= H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1Mn)−H(Zi|Zi−1Xn)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zi−1SiMn)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiXn)
}
≥
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|UiSi)−H(Zi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)− I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} .
Step (a) follows from that fn is a one-to-one mapping. Step
(b) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1 in
the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In the
case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiMnXn. (122)
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Step (b) follows from the above Markov chain.
Proof of Lemma 10: This lemma immediately follows from
Lemma 13.
F. Proof of Lemma 9
In this appendix we prove Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 9: Set Ui △= Y i−1Zni+1Mn. It can easily
be verified that Ui, XiSiZi, Yi form a Markov chain Ui →
XiSiZi → Yi in this order. In a manner similar to the proof
of Lemma 13, we obtain the following chains of inequalities:
I(Mn;Y
n) =
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1)−H(Yi|Y i−1Mn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1Zni+1Mn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1Zni+1Mn;Yi),
I(Mn;Z
n) = H(Zn)−H(Zn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−1)−
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zni+1Mn)
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|Zni+1Mn)
}
≤
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Si)−H(Zi|Y i−1Zni+1SiMn)
}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y i−1Zni+1Mn;Zi|Si) .
Step (a) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1
in the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In
the case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiMnXn. (123)
Step (a) follows from the above Markov chain. Hence, we
have
I(Mn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Yi),
I(Mn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Zi|Si).
Furthermore, by taking {Ui}ni=1 be constant in (119), (120) in
Lemma 14, we obtain
I(KnMn;Y
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(XiSi;Yi),
I(KnMn;Z
n) ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi|Si),
respectively. It remains to evaluate an upper bound of
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn) .
Since fn is deterministic, we have
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
= H(Y n|Mn)−H(Zn|Mn)−H(Y n|Xn)
+H(Zn|Xn) . (124)
We separately evaluate the following two quantities:
H(Y n|Mn)−H(Zn|Mn), H(Y n|Xn)−H(Zn|Xn).
We observe the following two identities:
H(Y n|Mn)−H(Zn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Yi|Y i−1Zni+1Mn)−H(Zi|Y i−1Zni+1Mn)
}
, (125)
−H(Y n|Xn) +H(Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
{−H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn) +H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn)} .(126)
Those identities follow from an elementary computation based
on the chain rule of entropy. From (125), we have
H(Y n|Mn)−H(Zn|Mn)
=
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi|Ui)−H(Zi|Ui)} . (127)
Next, we evaluate an upper bound of
−H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn) +H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn) .
Set U˜i
△
= Y ni+1Z
i−1X[i] . We have the following chain of
inequalities:
−H(Yi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn) +H(Zi|Y ni+1Zi−1Xn)
= −H(Yi|XiU˜i) +H(Zi|XiU˜i)
≤ −H(Yi|XiSiU˜i) +H(Zi|XiU˜i) (128)
(a)
= −H(Yi|XiSiU˜i) +H(Zi|XiSiU˜i)
= −H(Yi|ZiXiSiU˜i) + I(Yi;Zi|XiSiU˜i)
+H(Zi|YiXiSiU˜i)− I(Yi;Zi|XiSiU˜i)
= −H(Yi|ZiXiSiU˜i) +H(Zi|YiXiSiU˜i)
(b)
= −H(Yi|ZiXiSi) +H(Zi|YiXiSiU˜i)
≤ −H(Yi|ZiXiSi) +H(Zi|YiXiSi)
= −H(Yi|XiSi) + I(Yi;Zi|XiSi)
+H(Zi|XiSi)− I(Yi;Zi|XiSi)
= −H(Yi|XiSi) +H(Zi|XiSi) . (129)
Step (a) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1
in the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In
the case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiY ni+1Xn. (130)
Step (a) follows from the above Markov chain. Step (b) follows
from Yi → ZiXiSi → U˜i . Combining (124), (126), (127), and
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(129), we obtain
I(Kn;Y
n|Mn)− I(Kn;Zn|Mn)
≤
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi|Ui)−H(Zi|Ui)
−H(Yi|XiSi) +H(Zi|XiSi)}
≤
n∑
i=1
{H(Yi|Ui)−H(Zi|Ui)
−H(Yi|XiSiUi) +H(Zi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{I(XiSi;Yi|Ui)− I(XiSi;Zi|Ui)
+I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Yi|UiSi)− I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)
+ζ(Si;Yi, Zi|Ui) + I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} .
Finally, we prove (46). We have the following chain of
inequalities:
I(Kn;Z
n|Mn) = H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|KnMn)
(a)
= H(Zn|Mn)−H(Zn|Xn)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zni+1Mn)−H(Zi|Zi−1Xn)
}
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
{
H(Zi|Zni+1Mn)−H(Zi|Zi−1SiXn)
}
≥
n∑
i=1
{H(Zi|UiSi)−H(Zi|XiSi)}
=
n∑
i=1
{I(Xi;Zi|UiSi)− I(Ui;Zi|XiSi)} .
Step (a) follows from that fn is a one-to-one mapping. Step
(b) follows from that Si = gi(Zi−1) is a function of Zi−1 in
the case where {gi}ni=1 is restricted to be deterministic. In the
case where {gi}ni=1 is allowed to be stochastic, if Γ belongs
to the class NL, we have the following Markov chain:
Si → Zi−1 → ZiXn. (131)
Step (b) follows from the above Markov chain. Thus, the proof
of Lemma 9 is completed.
G. Proof of Lemma 12
We first observe that by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we
have
ES
(
EX(S)X(S)
)2 ≤ ES
[(√
EX(S)X2(S)
√
EX(S)1
)2]
= ESEX(S)X
2(S) ≤ P1 .
Then, there exits α ∈ [0, 1] such that
ES
(
EX(S)X(S)
)2
= α¯P1 .
We derive an upper bound of h(Y ). We have the following
chain of inequalities:
h(Y ) = h(X + S + ξ1)
≤ 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
EXS |X + S|2 +N1
)}
= 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
EXX
2 + 2EXSXS +ESS
2 +N1
)}
≤ 12 log {(2πe) (P1 + P2 + 2EXSXS +N1)} . (132)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
EXSXS = ES
[
SEX(S)X(S)
]
≤
√
ESS2
√
ES
(
EX(S)X(S)
)2
=
√
P2
√
α¯P1 . (133)
From (132) and (133), we have
h(Y ) ≤ 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
P1 + P2 +
√
α¯P1P2 +N1
)}
.
Next, we estimate an upper bound of h(Y |S). We have the
following chain of inequalities:
h(Y |S) = ES [h(X(S) + ξ1)]
≤ ES
[
1
2 log
{
(2πe)
(
VX(S) [X(S)] +N1
)}]
= ES
[
1
2 log
{
(2πe)
(
EX(S)[X
2(S)]
− (EX(S)X(S))2 +N1)}]
≤ 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
ESEX(S)[X
2(S)]
−ES
(
EX(S)X(S)
)2
+N1
)}
≤ 12 log {(2πe) (αP1 +N1)} .
Similarly, we obtain
h(Z|S) ≤ 12 log {(2πe) (αP1 +N2)} ,
h(Y˜ |S) ≤ 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
αP1 + N˜1
)}
. (134)
Since
h(Y˜ |S) ≥ h(Y˜ |XS) = 12 log
{
(2πe)N˜1
}
and (134), there exists β ∈ [0, 1] such that
h(Y˜ |US) = 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
βαP1 + N˜1
)}
.
Finally, we derive lower bounds of h(Y |US) and h(Z|US).
Let Y˜ (u, s) be a random variable with a conditional distribu-
tion of Y˜ for given (U, S)= (u, s). Similar notations are used
for Y and Z . From the relation (57) between X,S, Y, Z, and
Y˜ , we have
Y (u, s) = Y˜ (u, s) + a¯(s+ ξ˜2) , (135)
Z(u, s) = Y˜ (u, s)− a(s+ ξ˜2) . (136)
Note that Y˜ (u, s) is independent of ξ˜2. Applying entropy
power inequality to (135) and (136), we have
1
2πe2
2h(Y (u,s)) ≥ 12πe22h(Y˜ (u,s)) + 12πe22h(a¯(s+ξ˜2))
= 12πe2
2h(Y˜ (u,s)) + a¯2N˜2 ,
1
2πe2
2h(Z(u,s)) ≥ 12πe22h(Y˜ (u,s)) + 12πe22h(a(s+ξ˜2))
= 12πe2
2h(Y˜ (u,s)) + a2N˜2 ,
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from which we have
h(Y (u, s)) ≥ F1
(
h(Y˜ (u, s))
)
, (137)
h(Z(u, s)) ≥ F2
(
h(Y˜ (u, s))
)
, (138)
where
F1(γ)
△
=
1
2
log
(
22γ + (2πe)a¯2N˜2
)
,
F2(γ)
△
=
1
2
log
(
22γ + (2πe)a2N˜2
)
.
By a simple computation we can show that Fi(γ), i = 1, 2 are
monotone increasing and convex functions of γ. Taking the
expectation of both sides of (137) with respect to (U, S), we
have
h(Y |US)
= EUS [h(Y (U, S))] ≥ EUS
[
F1
(
h(Y˜ (U, S))
)]
(a)
≥ F1
(
EUS
[
h(Y˜ (U, S))
])
= F1
(
h(Y˜ |US)
)
= 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
βαP1 + N˜1 + a¯
2N˜2
)}
= 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
βαP1 +
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
+
N21+ρ
2N1N2−2ρN1
√
N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)}
= 12 log {(2πe) (βαP1 +N1)} .
Step (a) follows from the convexity of F1(γ) and Jensen’s
inequality. Taking the expectation of both sides of (138) with
respect to (U, S), we have
h(Z|US)
= EUS [h(Z(U, S))] ≥ EUS
[
F2
(
h(Y˜ (U, S))
)]
(a)
≥ F2
(
EUS
[
h(Y˜ (U, S))
])
= F2
(
h(Y˜ |US)
)
= 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
βαP1 + N˜1 + a
2N˜2
)}
= 12 log
{
(2πe)
(
βαP1 +
(1−ρ2)N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
+
N22+ρ
2N1N2−2ρN2
√
N1N2
N1+N2−2ρ
√
N1N2
)}
= 12 log {(2πe) (βαP1 +N2)} .
Step (a) follows from the convexity of F2(γ) and Jensen’s
inequality. Thus, the proof of Lemma 12 is completed.
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